Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business

In this chapter, Postman examines television news and explains why it is not a serious endeavor. He starts with the common transition phrase “now . . . this,” noting that it connects widely disparate bits of information and news void of any context. This gives television news no consequences or value, exposing its lack of seriousness. In short, the distribution of information is amusement disguised as news.

Several aspects provide evidence of this disguise. Firstly, newscasters must be physically attractive while also conveying some credibility. Postman questions what a person’s looks has to do with the news, but perhaps the larger issue is that of credibility. In 1981, a newscaster named Christine Craft was fired when the station’s surveys indicated that viewers thought she lacked credibility. Postman argues this implies she wasn’t persuasive enough, but wonders what she needed to persuade viewers—as facts are facts. Being persuasive is something actors do, this style of news presentation being more about theater than serious discourse. In addition, every newscast now incorporates music, something movies and television shows use to indicate mood and tell the audience how to feel. Music provides a soothing feeling that all is well no matter how bad the news.

Another aspect which speaks to entertainment is the brevity of each news story, averaging 45 seconds. There is simply no time to explore topics in depth. The news is presented against a constant backdrop of changing images, bringing their own entertainment value. In addition, however bad the news, presenters have no change of expression. A grisly murder is detailed in largely the same way as anything else; viewers know that “now . . . this” will soon bring more sanguine news. There are also frequent commercial breaks, signaling a lack of seriousness.

Producing a commercial television news program is virtually the same as packaging “the whole event as any producer might who is in the entertainment business” (106). As a result, Americans may be entertained but are not well informed. An example of this is coverage for the Iran Hostage Crisis (which, at the time Postman was writing, was in the recent past). Nothing received more press at the time (as coverage lasted more than a year), but Postman wonders how many Americans know even basic facts relating to it, such as what language Iranians speak or aspects of their religion. Still, everyone had an opinion about the situation, based more on “disinformation” than actual information. Postman uses “disinformation” not to mean intentionally misleading information but simply erroneous information that people think is true. This is how television news presented as entertainment warps reality.

This chapter is devoted to the subject of religion on television. Postman begins by describing the televangelists Reverend Terry (no last name given), Pat Robertson, and Jimmy Swaggart—pointing out how they come across on television. As it does with everything else, television turns religion—an ancient, profound, spiritual experience—into pure entertainment, such that “[o]n these shows, the preacher is tops. God comes out as second banana” (117). Postman compares these preachers unfavorably to the eminent theologians of an earlier time, such as Jonathan Edwards and George Whitefield, who were discussed in previous chapters. However, he blames this on the medium of television more so than the individuals themselves.

One reason that televised religious services are not the same as those in a church is that the space cannot be consecrated. Most religions require that the space used for its rituals be made sacred, and this cannot happen when a television beams them into people’s kitchens, bedrooms, and living rooms. In addition, a television screen becomes associated with secular things such as commercials, more profane programming; religious shows are interrupted multiple times by commercial breaks. Entertainment takes precedence over all else, as these shows’ lavish budgets from both donors and advertisers allow them to compete with other shows. Sets are pleasantly staged, and attractive people and celebrities often make guest appearances.

Televised religious shows also rely on modern marketing techniques, such as promotional gifts. More importantly, they give the audience what they want. Postman writes that this presentation is a warped version of true religion, which has traditionally given people what they need. Messages are trivialized, and demands on the believer fall away. To those who would say that many religions have long included theatrical elements to attract devotees, Postman says that such features are integral to the purpose of attaining the sacred. Television provides no such connection. Postman notes that on television, God is subordinate to the televangelist whose face occupies the screen and becomes the center of attention. Personalities dominate, and abstract ideas cannot adequately be expressed. Thus, religion is “dumbed down” for the masses. The medium of television may attract more followers than a church or religion could alone, but it ultimately changes the content of religion. As Postman writes, “the danger is not that religion has become the content of television shows but that television shows may become the content of religion” (124).

This chapter examines how television has changed politics. In modern America, politicians are packaged and sold like commodities, based on appearance. The main instrument for this is the television commercial. It is so pervasive that Postman estimates a 40-year-old American in 1985 would have seen more than one million of them.

Before discussing “h­ow it has devastated political discourse” (126), Postman looks at the television commercial’s effect on business. Capitalism is based on consumers making rational choices in their own self-interest, which requires that they be informed. Sellers, in turn, make claims about their product or service in the form of a proposition. Television advertisements have done away with this as they focus on images. Now, there are no claims but rather implied messages and myths that rely not on “what is right about the product but what is wrong about the buyer” (128). In this way, commercials try to make buyers think that a product or service will fix their inadequacies.

Television commercials have also become the main method of expressing political ideas as of the late 20th century. Postman writes that he had a hand in the campaign of Ramsey Clark, who had been running for the New York Senate seat of Jacob Javits. Clark prepared thoughtful, detailed position pieces on different issues, while Javits ran feel-good commercials more suited to selling fast food than serving in the United States Senate. Javits won in a landslide.

The second way in which television advertisements became predominant in political campaigns has to do with their appeal to images. Their brevity and light nature imply that all political issues can be solved quickly and easily by the candidate onscreen. Today, candidates become integrated into society more as celebrities than anything else. Postman reminds readers of a time when people voted by party, sometimes without even knowing who the candidate was. Whether this was better than focusing on the individual is debatable, but one thing is certain: Television is not where voters will get the true measure of a candidate. Instead, television gives voters an image of themselves. Just as selling a car uses pseudo-psychology to appeal to what customers want, so does selling a candidate to voters.

This focus on the image in politics not only removes content but history. Images have neither the context nor linear structure required for history. Postman surmises that George Orwell was wrong about history being suppressed by governments, against the will of the people. Aldous Huxley had it right when he envisioned a future in which history disappeared and people didn’t care. Instead of techniques like book-banning and censorship, our actual threat is amusement provided by corporations. History is not killed off so much as simply allowed to wither and disappear from television. Postman writes, “Television does not ban books, it simply displaces them” (141)—and entertainment becomes political discourse.

In this chapter, Postman describes television’s influence on education, beginning with the show Sesame Street. He argues that despite its educational focus, Sesame Street actual undermines schooling because its characteristics are so different from the classroom. He doesn’t blame the show for trying to create good television, but again turns to the technology itself, placing the blame on television as pervading all our institutions. In short, Sesame Street teaches children to love television, not school.

Television is a kind of curriculum, one that competes with the school curriculum. Firstly, television equates teaching with entertainment, a radical idea found in no educational philosophy. Postman describes three “commandments” that direct television’s philosophy toward learning. First is “Thou shalt have no prerequisites” (147), which results in information that has no hierarchy or connection because no previous knowledge is necessary. Every program is self-contained, implying that thought itself is as well—without continuity or order. Second is “Thou shalt induce no perplexity” (147). All learning must be easy because perplexity results in low ratings. Third is “Thou shalt avoid exposition like the ten plagues visited upon Egypt” (148). Without exposition—the traditional method of creating rational thought—the only structure allowed is storytelling.

A second aspect to emphasize about television as curriculum is that it not only makes the classroom less effective, it also forces teaching and learning to be amusing. Postman explores the science and math program “The Voyage of the Mimi,” created by several entities with the U.S. Department of Education. The program revolved around a television show about studying whales from a research boat. There were accompanying books and computer games to reinforce what was taught in the video portion.

Postman criticizes this format for several reasons. Firstly, it was touted a groundbreaking approach using multimedia, but teachers have always augmented lessons with what “was once called ‘audio-visual aids’” (150). Secondly, its creators claimed that learning is improved when information is presented dramatically. Postman presents research in academic literature to refute this claim, most of which show that print actually produces better learning. Thirdly, he argues that subject matter was chosen because it translated well into dramatization. In other words, television once again dictated content: Now, the news, religion, politics, and education are all provided in the same amusing way as commerce.

Postman concludes the book by emphasizing that Aldous Huxley’s vision of the future won out over George Orwell’s. What Huxley calls “spiritual devastations” have come not from heavy-handed tyrannies but rather our own choices as we consume entertainment and it, figuratively, consumes us. This spiritual devastation is often either invisible or not seen as a problem at all. People don’t recognize that technology itself is an ideology and “has altered every aspect of life in America during the past eighty years” (157). Postman says this is inexcusable because we have seen the changes technology has wrought for a long time, ever since the Industrial Revolution.

Though there may be no solution to the reign of television, Postman feels compelled to provide a few suggestions. One is that television is here is stay, so any calls to roll back the clock and do away with it, or somehow limit it, are pointless. It doesn’t matter what people watch, but Postman sees a possible answer in how people watch. Despite his constant use of the phrase “Information Age” to describe our present era, he contends that people don’t know what information actually is. He believes it would do well for everyone to learn more about information. For example: “What is the relation between information and reason? What is the kind of information that best facilitates thinking? Is there a moral bias to each information form?” (160). The point is not to come up with a “correct” answer but the interrogation itself.

Demystification of the medium can be done in two ways. The first is to use television to demonstrate all its effects on culture. Postman envisions this being done through parody, much like a Monty Python skit. However, he ultimately calls this approach “nonsensical” because television would naturally coopt the process by placing amusement above any instruction. The second way is to address the issue through schools, the time-honored way of dealing with social problems. Teachers have become media savvy and should teach their students how to interpret this new technology’s influence on our culture.