41 pages • 1 hour read
Virginia EubanksA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
In the early 1800s, poorhouses were large warehouses where sick and destitute Americans could work in farms or quarries for minimal pay and a dirty place to sleep. The first American poorhouse was erected in Boston in 1662, but by the 1820s poorhouses became more common, as the economic depression following the War of 1812, which saw wages fall “as much as 80 percent” (17), created what was colloquially known as the “pauper problem.”
The horrors of the poorhouse led to a societal distinction between the impotent and the able poor: The former were wholly incapable of work, and the latter were “just shirking” (17). Poorhouses were designed to be horrific—“overcrowded, ill-ventilated, filthy, insufferably hot in the summer and deathly cold in the winter” (19)—specifically to discourage a habit of seeking aid.
At the same time, poorhouses were also profitable enterprises, preying on the weakest and most vulnerable members of society, like people with physical or cognitive disabilities, who often had nowhere else to go: “Poorhouses were neither debtor’s prisons nor slavery. Those arrested for vagrancy, drunkenness, illicit sex, or begging could be forcibly confined in them. But for many, entry was technically voluntary. The poorhouse was a home of last resort” (20). Left mostly unregulated, poorhouses were the “primary mode of property management” until the Panic of 1873, a “postwar economic boom [that] collapsed under the weight of Gilded Age corruption” (20), and the Great Railroad Strike of 1877, the first national strike in US history.
While European governments reacted to the post-war recession by introducing welfare systems, the American government advocated for the rise of scientific charity. Scientific charity “argued for more rigorous, data-driven methods to separate the deserving poor from the undeserving” (21), so caseworkers were trained to act as antagonists for their poor clients. Scientific charity also “considered African American poverty a separate issue from white poverty” (24) and began to be associated with eugenics as well as Jim Crow laws. It relied “on a slew of new inventions: the caseworker, the relief investigation, the eugenics record, the data clearinghouse. It drew on what lawyers, academics, and doctors believed to be the most empirically sophisticated science of its time” (24).
Scientific charity was stretched past its breaking point during the Great Depression of the 1930s, when poverty affected so many middle-class whites that the division between deserving and undeserving poor became less clear. Roosevelt’s historic New Deal, which “undoubtedly saved thousands of lives and prevented destitution for millions” (26), created a newly stable, white, and patriarchal middle class. It “reestablished the divide between the able and the impotent poor” (27), uplifting only those able and willing to work.
The civil rights movement of the mid-20th century brought to light concerns about the whitewashed state of social welfare. The two-tier social insurance and public assistance welfare state was born. At the time, “welfare required that poor people trade their rights—to bodily integrity, safe work environments, mobility, political participation, privacy, and self-determination—for meager aid for their families” (29).
Welfare activism, also fueled by emerging second-wave feminism, led to Nixon establishing the Family Assistance Program (FAP) in the late sixties—a meager program that only guaranteed an income far below poverty wages. In the 1970s, New York Republican governor Nelson Rockefeller helped establish the Welfare Management System (WMS). Despite costing $84.5 million, it was ineffective, with fewer and fewer people living under the poverty line receiving assistance each year. When Bill Clinton claimed to end welfare during his time in office, he was continuing “an expansion and continuation of moralistic and punitive poverty management strategies that have been with us since the 1820s” (37).
By beginning with the physical poorhouses of decades ago, and by describing how their physical dismantlement occurred without the parallel eradication of underlying bias and inequality, Eubanks sets the stage for understanding the development of the digital poorhouse of today. Eubanks disparages the false morality of separating the deserving poor from the undeserving poor—a false dichotomy that allows the middle-class to discriminate without guilt and to believe that poverty is a choice. This belief is self-protective—it assures the non-poor that if they tread carefully, they can avoid poverty. The unspoken assumption is that smart citizens naturally enter the middle class; what this assumption fails to recognize, however, is that wealth, health, and social standing are largely arbitrary, and the poor aren’t poor due to lack of intelligence. Nevertheless, by couching this moral distinction under the guise of amoral and unbiased science, elites built self-excusing distance between the haves and the have nots: “scientific charity turned to institutionalization: those who weren’t morally pure enough for their charity or strong enough to support themselves were sent to the poorhouse” (24).
Eubanks describes the US response to the wealth gap as marked by increasing privatization, which our political system supports and enables. Elected leaders lean on the technological systems private businesses have created. However, technological solutions typically replicate the biases they are supposedly meant to prevent—biases present in their creators and in the datasets that shape their algorithms—thus reifying racial and gender inequality even without intending to. Just as scientific charity had racism coded into its very inception, so too do automated systems entrench prejudice. Both solutions to poverty relied on the public’s trust in experts: High-tech, data-informed welfare seems better than simple redistribution of resources. In reality, they proliferate because they are profitable. Just like the original brick and mortar poorhouses, which were predatory because they produced wealth for their owners, the new digital poorhouses persists because it is financially lucrative for the companies that design its systems and for the politicians whom they support.
The state of the public welfare system has simply not kept up with the price of living; in some ways, it has actively worked backwards by infringing upon basic human rights and decency. Eubanks’s outline of labor rights in America over the past century backs up her claim that the borders of the digital poorhouse have been slowly building up over time due to lack of interference.
Cracks in the system run deeper than expected. Moreover, this allows for the possibility of actual bad actors who are not the destitute, but those who prey on the poor’s labor and wages. That the new poorhouse owners see their algorithmic interventions as social justice allows them to further exploit the poor.
Books on Justice & Injustice
View Collection
Books on U.S. History
View Collection
Business & Economics
View Collection
Class
View Collection
Class
View Collection
Common Reads: Freshman Year Reading
View Collection
Contemporary Books on Social Justice
View Collection
Equality
View Collection
Political Science Texts
View Collection
Politics & Government
View Collection
Poverty & Homelessness
View Collection
Science & Nature
View Collection
Sociology
View Collection