Consolation Of Philosophy

Philosophy intends to show Boethius that good is inherently strong and evil inherently weak. In the first instance, both the good and the wicked are striving for the supreme good; yet only the good obtain it. If the wicked obtained the good, they would no longer be wicked.

In the second instance, the good seek their goal through the exercise of their virtues, which is the natural and proper means of obtaining it; whereas the wicked seek the very same goal through unnatural means, namely their desires. Thus, the wicked are naturally weak and powerless because they are unequipped to obtain what they seek. Good people obtain the good, but wicked people do not.

Philosophy argues that wicked people lack existence in a complete and unqualified sense since they depart from their proper nature. Furthermore, Philosophy argues three points. First, God, who is all good, is omnipotent.

Second, human beings, who are capable of evil, are not omnipotent. Third, evil is, therefore, less powerful.

Philosophy purports four conclusions. First, power is worth pursuing. Second, all worthwhile objects of pursuit are related to the good. Third, the ability to commit a crime cannot be a form of goodness. Fourth, the ability to do evil is, therefore, not a form of power. From all this it is evident that “evil things cannot reach happiness” (92).

In verse, Philosophy illustrates that beneath surface power often lurks the weakness and enslavement of evil: Strip away a king's showy robes, and you will see him wearing the fetters of lust, wrath, and sorrow. 

Philosophy continues to speak of the fate of the good versus the fate of the wicked. She emphasizes the truth that virtue is its own reward, and likewise evil its own punishment: “[A]ll good men obtain happiness in virtue of their being good” (93). Since it was established earlier that all good things enjoy unity, it follows that as things become evil, they lose unity and existence, verging on non-being. The wicked appear human but are in fact inhuman, sinking to the level of beasts. The good, by contrast, approach to a godly state through their goodness.

In verse, Philosophy recalls the moral lessons imparted in Homer's Odyssey. 

Continuing along the same lines of thought, philosophy argues that the wicked are less happy if they achieve their desires than if they fail to do so. This is because wickedness is its own punishment, and legal punishment is corrective and thus good for the wicked. Philosophy argues that “just as weakness is a disease of the body, so wickedness is a disease of the mind” (100). Therefore, the wicked should be treated with compassion and pity to bring them back to health, rather than with hatred and outrage: “Then love the good, show pity for the bad” (101). 

Boethius accepts Philosophy's argument that rewards and punishments are inherent in good and bad actions. Yet he still has difficulty reconciling the varying fortunes of the good and the wicked with the providence of a just God. Philosophy assures him that there is no reason to doubt that “a good power rules the world and that everything happens aright” (102).

In verse, using metaphors from nature, Philosophy emphasizes that human beings are needlessly worried by events that rarely come to pass. 

Boethius begs Philosophy to resolve his difficulties, including providence and fate, divine knowledge and predestination, and the freedom of the will.

First, Philosophy explains the difference between providence and fate. All earthly things that are subject to change have their origin in the unchanging mind of God. God in his wisdom sets up a plan for everything that will happen. When considered as it exists in God's mind, this is called Providence; when considered with reference to the things it governs, it is called Fate. They are different, but Fate depends on and is subject to Providence.

Philosophy likens this to the work of a craftsman. Providence is like the craftsman's mental picture of what he is going to make, and Fate is the execution of the work. She further likens it to the difference between eternity and time, between understanding and reasoning, and between something that exists and something that is coming into being.

In his providence, God distributes good and bad fortune according to individual temperament and need, with a view to directing all people to goodness. Some he “brings to self-discovery through hardship” (108), while others, the wicked, are often reformed as a result of suffering bad fortune. On the other hand, a person for whom bad fortune would be a provocation to commit evil will instead receive a dose of good fortune to offset this tendency.

Although it seems as if evil has free rein on earth, Philosophy assures Boethius that if he could see from the perspective of God's providence, he would “not think there was evil anywhere” (110).

Admitting that this chain of reasoning has been long and difficult, Philosophy invites Boethius to refresh himself with song. In verse, she celebrates the lordship and providence of God over the universe. 

Philosophy concludes that all fortune is necessarily good. This is because all fortune is intended “either to reward or discipline the good or to punish or correct the bad” (111). Philosophy urges Boethius to think of fortune as a brave man would regard battle: as an opportunity, a “bitter but spirited struggle” (113). It is in our own hands what we wish to make of the fortune we experience.

In verse, Philosophy reflects on the moral lessons learned from the history of the Trojan War.