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Erik LarsonA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
After the Lusitania’s sinking, the British Admiralty decides to blame the entire disaster on Captain Turner. However, before the Admiralty can begin its own investigation into the disaster, an Irish coroner, John J. Horgan, begins a separate inquest. During the inquest, Horgan asks Turner to testify, and he concludes that Turner did all he could to protect the Lusitania.
Despite Turner’s testimony, the Admiralty decides that Turner is at fault, arguing that he did not properly follow the Admiralty’s orders for avoiding submarine attacks. The Admiralty is particularly incensed that Turner brought his ship close to shore in St. George’s Channel—a violation of the Admiralty’s order to remain “midchannel” (318). It is further incensed that the Lusitania was not traveling at its full speed during the attack and that it had not followed orders to maintain a zigzag course, which the Admiralty claims would have helped it evade submarines. However, some individuals, such as Consul Frost, believe that the Admiralty’s orders did not provide the Lusitania with enough information. Larson argues that the Admiralty chooses to blame Turner for the disaster to deflect attention away from its own culpability in the tragedy. For instance, it did not provide the Lusitania with a navy escort even though it knew that the Lusitania was in danger. The Admiralty fears that if too much attention is placed on its role in the disaster, the existence of Room 40 and its codebreakers will be revealed.
In June, the navy begins its official investigation, led by Lord Mersey. While several witnesses are called to give public testimonies, the vast majority of the investigation is conducted in secret. During the investigation, the Admiralty again argues that if Turner had followed its orders—sailing midchannel and using a zigzag course—the Lusitania would have evaded the attack. In response, Turner testifies that he typically sailed the Lusitania far closer to the shore and that he thought the ship was midchannel during the attack. After hearing the witness testimony, Mersey breaks with the Admiralty and “absolve[s] Turner of any responsibility for the loss of the Lusitania” (322).
In this penultimate section, Larson describes the aftermath of the Lusitania shipwreck and the impact it has on the war. President Woodrow Wilson does not immediately respond to the shipwreck. Instead, he waits a few days to allow his emotions to cool and to think of a rational response. Wilson ultimately decides that, despite the nation’s outrage over the attack, America is still not ready to go to war. On Monday, May 10, Wilson finally addresses the attack in a public speech. During the speech, Wilson is in an “emotional haze” due to an earlier meeting with Edith Galt, and he misspeaks, saying that America is “too proud” to go to war (331). Many Americans are incensed by his statement.
Over the next two days, Wilson works on a written protest to Germany. The protest, known as the First Lusitania Note, strongly decries German’s attack on merchant ships that transport innocent passengers. The note sparks tensions between Germany and America for the next two years. Germany continues to attack neutral ships, and Wilson responds by continually denouncing the attacks with written protests. However, Wilson remains unwilling to declare war. Eventually, Kaiser Wilhelm II, the German emperor, starts to believe that unrestricted submarine warfare is unethical, and he orders German submarines not to attack any passenger ships—British or otherwise. However, as the years go on, Germany realizes that its submarine fleet is its best hope for winning the war. Wilhelm agrees to authorize attacks on “all merchant ships entering the war zone,” including American ships (335). He believed that such a strategy would quickly win the war for Germany even if it forced America into the war in the process.
The German ambassador alerts Wilson to Germany’s new strategy, but Wilson still remains unwilling to declare war. Britain’s Room 40 intercepts a German diplomatic communication sent by Arthur Zimmerman, revealing that Germany has offered to help Mexico win back land from America. Room 40 covertly alerts America about the telegram, which outrages Woodrow Wilson. News of the Zimmerman telegram, as well as Germany’s attacks on American ships, convinces the American public that the time for war has come. Wilson delivers a speech asking Congress to declare war, explaining that “America’s fight was a fight on behalf of all nations” (342). Congress emphatically agrees, authoring a resolution on April 6, 1917. Several weeks later, America sends six of its destroyers to join Britain’s navy.
In the Epilogue, Larson describes what happens to key individuals who were connected to the Lusitania’s sinking. In November 1915, Captain Turner is asked to take charge of the Ultonia, a small cargo ship that transports horses. In December 1916, Turner is placed in charge of a warship, the Ivernia. One month later, the ship is torpedoed by Germans and sunk. Afterwards, the Cunard Steamship Company puts Turner in charge of the Mauretania. In 1918, family members of the Lusitania’s victims file a lawsuit against the Cunard Steamship Company, and Turner is forced to testify in a New York federal court. The judge, however, finds that Turner did nothing wrong during his handling of the attack. However, several years later, Winston Churchill publishes a book in which he again claims that the Lusitania’s sinking was solely the fault of Turner.
Schwieger continues to serve as a submarine captain throughout the war, earning an award for the number of ships he destroyed. After running his U-20 aground, Schwieger is named captain of a larger submarine, the U-88. The U-88 sinks in September 1917 when Schwieger encounters the British HMS Stonecrop.
Captain William Reginald Hall, director of Britain’s naval intelligence, is honored by the British government for his work during the war. However, this honor must be kept secret because the British government doesn’t want other countries to know that Captain Hall’s work involved Room 40. A decade after the war, Hall decides to write a book describing Room 40 and the nature of his service. However, Hall is told not to publish the memoir because Britain senses that Room 40’s codebreaking will become relevant during upcoming conflicts. During World War II, Hall serves for several years as Britain’s chief of intelligence.
In Part 5, “The Sea of Secrets,” Larson examines the historical aftermath of the Lusitania’s sinking. Shortly after the tragedy, the British Admiralty seeks to place full responsibility for the Lusitania’s sinking on Captain Turner, arguing that Turner failed to follow the Admiralty’s orders. The Admiralty claims that Turner was sailing the Lusitania close to shore at the time of its attack even though he was ordered to sail it at “midchannel” (321). Turner, however, successfully argues that he was sailing the Lusitania at midchannel during the attack. The Admiralty claims that Turner is still at fault because he failed to follow its orders to sail the ship in a zigzag pattern. Larson notes that Turner’s navigational maneuver of a four-point bearing would qualify as sailing in a “zigzag pattern” (322). This zigzag pattern ultimately leads to the Lusitania’s destruction. If Turner had maintained a straight course, the Lusitania would not have been in the U-20’s firing range. Despite the Admiralty’s attempts to pin the blame for the disaster on Turner, he is ultimately declared free of all responsibility for the attack.
Larson notes that the Admiralty’s swift attempts to implicate Turner are suspicious. At first glance, there is no clear reason why Turner should be blamed when the Lusitania’s destruction was so clearly the fault of the German U-20. However, Larson suggests that the British Admiralty tried to blame Turner in order to guard a number of secrets, including the operations of Room 40. When communicating with Turner, the Admiralty always neglects to mention the numerous pieces of information that Room 40 intercepted about the U-20’s actions before it attacked the Lusitania. Such an oversight may have been an attempt to keep the Germans from learning about Room 40. However, this information would also have revealed that the British Admiralty knew that the Lusitania was in danger and did not take actions to properly protect it from attack. Larson suggests that the Admiralty’s failure to protect the Lusitania may actually have been intentional. It is possible that the Admiralty hoped that Germany’s destruction of the Lusitania would force America to ally with Britain and join the war. However, Larson’s interpretation remains speculative because there is “silence on the subject [of why the Admiralty did not protect the Lusitania]” in Room 40’s archives (323). The full truth of the Admiralty’s inaction remains a historical mystery.
By Erik Larson