69 pages • 2 hours read
Heather Cox RichardsonA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Nixon’s southern strategy relied on rousing emotion rather than invoking reason, which Nixon aides said required too much “discipline.” Black activism and the “New Left” became Nixon’s scapegoats. Meanwhile, the Democratic National Convention of 1968 saw a battle between the New Left and the establishment. This division meant that even though more Americans voted for candidates other than Nixon, the Electoral College put him in office. Behind the scenes, Nixon and his team undermined peace talks in Vietnam to make Democrats look bad: This attempted undermining of an election was not fully accepted until the 2017 discovery of the notes from Nixon’s aide H.R. Haldeman. Nixon used scapegoats and media manipulation to argue that his opponents were “lazy, dangerous, and anti-American” (53). While Nixon initially targeted anti-war protestors and college students, in 1963 he began targeting Black and Brown Americans. This led to the resurrection of the Confederate flag and the establishment of more Confederate monuments.
Nixon’s administration used rhetoric to turn what had previously been considered commonsense health decisions of the liberal consensus into politicized talking points. In the late 1960s, Nixon ordered all military hospitals to perform abortions, even in states without legalization. In 1971, Nixon changed course, rhetorically fashioning “women’s lib” as an assault on the traditional role of wife and mother. This rhetoric made abortion—previously a medically accepted part of the liberal consensus—a stand-in for “anti-family agitators” (55). Nixon resigned in August 1974 after the Watergate scandal, but his ideological and rhetorical manipulation that led to conceptions of “good” and “bad” Americans persevered.
Ronald Reagan resurrected many of Nixon’s strategies, “re-creating a nation based on the idea that some people are better than others” (58). In 1980, Reagan—with the help of Nixon advisors like Paul Manafort and Roger Stone—“spun the story of a ‘welfare queen’ [...] who lived large on benefits she stole” (59). Media again immortalized the image of the independent, patriarchal cowboy in the books and television series Little House on the Prairie, shaped by Laura Ingalls Wilder’s libertarian daughter to depict “Pa” as the traditional “benevolent patriarch” who morally led his home-bound, female-dominated family.
This emphasis on traditionalism married Movement Conservatism to “right-wing religious groups” using the slogan “make America great again” (60-61), appealing to a pre-civil rights era. While terms such as “liberal media” initially meant “media that required fact-based argument” (61), this ideological shift politicized that designation. As Reagan grew less popular in the mid-1980s, the Federal Communications Committee appointed by Reagan ended the “Fairness Doctrine,” which necessitated radio media “to present information honestly and fairly” (63), enabling hosts like Rush Limbaugh, who attacked “‘feminazis,’ liberals, and Black Americans” (63).
In 1990, Newt Gingrich’s Republican training organization GOPAC distributed a memo called “Language: A Key Mechanism of Control,” which detailed the verbs, adjectives, and nouns Republicans should use to refer to Democrats. In a 1992 speech to the Republican National Convention, Pat Buchanan styled the opposition between parties as a “culture war” over the “struggle for the soul of America” (65). This rhetoric positioned the Republican base as a perceived “underclass” struggling to save the nation from those who threaten their “freedom.”
Bill Clinton’s win in 1992 further incentivized the Movement Conservative mission, introducing accusations of “voter fraud” to explain away Republican losses. None of the 1996 House and Senate investigations into voter fraud found evidence supporting the accusations, but Southern states like Florida purged voter rolls through the late 1990s, which influenced George W. Bush’s 2000 presidential victory over Al Gore. Subsequent civil rights investigations uncovered “an extraordinarily high and inexcusable level of disenfranchisement” masquerading as “voter fraud” (67).
This “shifting away from democracy” (68) was mirrored from the late 1980s onward in the realm of executive and judicial power. In 1986, then-lawyer Samuel Alito proposed a plan to make the president the “unitary executive” without “congressional oversight” (69). In the 1980s, Republicans elected judges who argued that the government cannot take any action “not explicitly written in the 1787 Constitution”: By definition, this eliminated many hallmarks of the liberal consensus.
These shifts empowered the Reagan government’s “flirtation with authoritarianism through foreign affairs” (70), illegally selling weapons to Iran to fund the Contras, a right-wing group in Nicaragua, and shredding subpoenaed documentation. Democrats labeled this “secrecy, deception, and disdain for the law” (71), but Republicans questioned the patriotism of the investigation.
After September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush launched rocket attacks on the Taliban in Afghanistan. The 2002 Bush Doctrine determined that the United States would “preemptively strike nations suspected of planning attacks on the U.S.” (75). Due to the Iraq War’s unpopularity, the administration paralleled “supporting Republicans” with “defending the nation against Islamic terrorists” (75). They “manufactured information” to justify the invasion of Iraq. The increased executive power established over the previous decades enabled Bush to overturn Congress’s attempts to rein in the military of his executive power. One senior Bush advisor told journalist Ron Suskind that Suskind was operating in “the reality-based community” whereas Republicans “create [their] own reality” (77).
While 2008 Republican presidential nominee John McCain attempted to differentiate himself from the extreme wing of his party, his running mate Sarah Palin embraced and perpetuated popular populist, racist talking points, especially against their opposition, Barack Obama. She claimed he was “palling around with terrorists” (78), and right-wing news media fed into the “Birther conspiracy,” which purported that Obama was not a US citizen despite evidence to the contrary. In the wake of Obama’s election, some Republicans formed the “Tea Party,” which was “worried about socialism, voter fraud, and what they saw as an influx of Black and Brown people” (79).
Redistricting and gerrymandering in 2012 further undermined democracy by using “pack” or “crack” methods to either inequitably bunch up or separate voters of certain demographics. Throughout Obama’s tenure, Republicans in Congress obstructed Democratic efforts to legislate and govern, which they saw as the best way to “destroy” Americans’ faith in the federal government. This collided with the longtime Republican incentive to stack the courts, culminating in Senate leader Mitch McConnell’s refusal to consider Obama’s moderate Supreme Court nominee.
Structurally, the beginning of Part 1 focuses on the establishment of the liberal consensus in Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidency, which in turn was inspired by the Lincoln administration’s focus on the freedoms stated in the Declaration of Independence. Richardson makes it clear that through the early 20th century, opposition to the liberal consensus was a vocal minority that did not gain much headway in mainstream politics.
In these chapters, Richardson shows how Movement Conservative ideology became mainstream, united itself with other ideological causes, and crystallized the two major political parties into their 21st-century forms. Richardson proposes that the main strategy lawmakers used to do this was The Use of False History to Manipulate Ideology through the Nixon and Reagan administrations. False history roots itself into peoples’ beliefs with the use of extreme rhetoric based on “in” and “out” groups, in which the in-group of white men consider themselves “good” Americans threatened by increasing rights for the out-groups of women, Black Americans, and other racialized people in the United States. These strategies led to some Americans developing a hierarchy of citizenship in which “some people are better than others” (58), which set the stage for authoritarianism.
Richardson discusses the process Nixon and Reagan went through to “appeal to Movement Conservatives” (52). First, Nixon tried to earn their support “without undermining the liberal consensus” (52), but he changed his methods amid growing negative sentiment against the Vietnam War and his leadership. His first method was using rhetoric to create a scapegoat to turn his supporters against, to take the pressure off of himself. His “scapegoats” were “anti-Vietnam war protestors,” “college students,” and “Black and Brown Americans” (53). Scapegoating is the process of “focusing or deflecting blame onto an individual or group”: Psychologists have found that there is a “dual-motive” model that underwrites scapegoating, when people want to “maintain their own moral identity by displacing their guilt” or “maintain perceived control by obtaining a clear causal explanation” for an event (Rothschild, Zachary K. and Lucas A. Keefer. “Who Scapegoats? Individual Differences Moderate the Dual-Motive Model of Scapegoating.” Journal of Research in Personality, vol. 105, 2023). People who scapegoat want to seem “moral.” Richardson explains how Nixon rhetorically fashioned his supporters and himself as “hardworking, tax-paying individuals” and “good” Americans (53)—or the “moral” side of America. The other motivation for scapegoating in the dual-motive model is to maintain control by providing overly simple, clear, causal explanations for national events. Richardson details how Nixon labeled his critics “lazy people who wanted a government handout” (53), or “anti-family agitators” (55). Rather than devoting time to explaining the complexity and nuance of American beliefs and politics, Nixon blamed his scapegoats for creating the nation’s problems.
This rhetorical division persevered even after Nixon left office, showing how The Throughline of Authoritarian Sentiment in US History was more powerful than any single president. It continued through Reagan’s presidency, where the scapegoats became Black women, who Reagan caricatured as “welfare queens,” a “nonexistent” and “deliberately false” stereotype. Richardson says Reagan’s administration used this rhetorical conflation between economic disenfranchisement and Black rights to “invit[e] voters to remember a time before Black and Brown voices and women began to claim equal rights” (60), creating a false history.
False history weakened “the actual mechanics of democracy” (66), as Movement Conservatives became convinced they had to do whatever it took to gain control, including undermining the democratic process. They questioned “ballot integrity,” claiming voter fraud, passing restrictive voting laws, redlining, and gerrymandering voting districts through tactics like “packing” and “cracking.” Reagan’s attorney general Edwin Meese said that these strategies were implemented to “institutionalize the Reagan revolution so it can’t be set aside no matter what happens in future presidential elections” (69). Richardson highlights the success of this strategy by discussing how the two Republicans elected president in the 21st century both lost the popular vote, the first of whom, George W. Bush, had half a million fewer votes than Al Gore. These trends come to a head and set up Richardson’s lengthy, Part 2 discussion of the second president to lose the popular vote, Donald Trump.
American Literature
View Collection
Books on U.S. History
View Collection
Challenging Authority
View Collection
Contemporary Books on Social Justice
View Collection
Essays & Speeches
View Collection
Nation & Nationalism
View Collection
Political Science Texts
View Collection
Politics & Government
View Collection
Power
View Collection