44 pages • 1 hour read
Hannah ArendtEichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1963A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Epilogue-PostscriptChapter Summaries & Analyses
Epilogue Summary
Several objections are raised against the Eichmann trial, namely that “Eichmann was tried under a retroactive law and appeared in the court of the victors,” as well as questions about the competence and effectiveness of the Jewish court (254). The court maintains that the laws had to be retroactive as they were trying past crimes of genocide for which there were no precedents, and the question is about the law’s adequacy, rather than its retroactivity. As to the second objection, the Jewish court has “as much right to sit in judgment on the crimes committed against their people as the Poles had to judge crimes committed in Poland” (259). What distinguishes the Eichmann trial from the Nuremberg Trials is that the Jews mete out the judgment regarding the “greatest crime committed during the last war” which “had been against the Jews,” when in Nuremberg, they had felt like “bystanders” (258). What also distinguishes the Eichmann trial from other Successor trials is that Eichmann “had not been duly arrested and extradited to Israel,” which is “a clear violation of international law” (263). However, Arendt argues that if justice is the central goal of this trial, rather than setting precedents, then those who adhere to that belief “will be inclined to condone” Eichmann’s capture as a “desperate […] act, necessitated by the unsatisfactory condition of international law” (265). Arendt argues that any questions of the court’s competency should have been addressed prior to the trial, but once the trial begins and a court is “declared competent, it must also pass judgment” (270).
Some failures of the court, according to Arendt, include not establishing a valid definition of “crimes against humanity” or a way to clearly identify the type of criminal who commits this type of crime. One of the more powerful aspects of Eichmann’s trial, concludes Arendt, is that the Jewish people are able to judge crimes against their own people without relying on the promises and protection of others. Any precedent set by Eichmann’s trial or by the events of the Holocaust itself, Arendt warns, makes it ever more possible for these same events to happen again. Arendt predicts that with the advancement of modern technology and nuclear energy, the instruments of war that will be available will make “Hitler’s gassing installations look like an evil child’s fumbling toys” (273).
Postscript Summary
Since there were so many translations during the trial, Arendt defines which transcripts and languages she uses as reference. She also lists what materials are given to the press during the trial and clarifies that what is on her bibliography only represents what she used for the book and not all the additional books and newspapers and articles she read in preparation. Arendt critiques her critics, stating the book “became both the center of a controversy and the object of an organized campaign” through means of “image-making and opinion-manipulation” (282). The controversy centers around Arendt’s discussion of the role of Jewish leaders during the Final Solution. She defends her positions on some matters and shows that other objections have no relation to her book. Arendt brings her analysis back to the courtroom, restating that its primary function is to try, judge, and mete out punishment, and, overall, Arendt believes “the court in Jerusalem succeeded in fulfilling the demands of justice” (298).
Epilogue-Postscript Analysis
Arendt focuses on the successes and failures of the Jewish court in their trial and conviction of Eichmann and the objections critics maintained against the proceedings. For the critics who claim a Jewish court cannot rule with partiality, Arendt retorts that Polish courts rule on crimes in Poland, as does Italy, as does any other court in the world, so the court in Jerusalem should be no different. For the critics who point out that international law is violated by the kidnapping of Eichmann by the Israeli government, Arendt pushes back by arguing that the international laws do not hold water here because of the size of Eichmann’s crimes; for those, new laws will have to be written. Arendt justifies her findings and analysis by listing what documents are made available to her as press, what materials she reads by her own volition, and how she determines what appears in her bibliography and in what order. Much of the Epilogue and Postscript are dedicated to responding to the onslaught of criticisms both she and the book endured. In the summation of her Epilogue, Arendt writes for the judges what she wishes they would have said, and it is an evocative reminder of her humanity: she is a German Jewish refugee, creating the text she needs the German accused to hear at the end of his time in the Jewish court. She reminds readers that Eichmann was “terrifyingly normal” (276), so much so that there are many like him and that, based on this pervasive “banality,” these events are certain to happen again.
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