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Herodotus

Histories

Nonfiction | Book | Adult

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Book 8Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Book 8 Summary

Book 8 traces the movements of the Greek and Persian forces after the battle of Thermopylae, as Xerxes continues his march toward Attica. After an indecisive naval engagement at Artemisium, the Persians proceed through Boeotia and devastate the Attic countryside, burning the Athenian acropolis. The Book culminates in the decisive victory of the Greek fleet at Salamis, which induces Xerxes to withdraw from Greece and return to Asia, leaving his general Mardonius behind with 300,000 troops to continue the campaign against the Athenians and Peloponnesians.

While the Greek forces under Leonidas were preparing to defend Thermopylae, the Greek confederacy sent a fleet of 271 large warships under the command of a Spartan, Eurybiades, to Artemisium on the northern tip of Euboea. The Greek allies refused to serve under an Athenian even though the Athenians provided more than half the vessels in the armada. Realizing that the unity in the face of the Persian threat was Greece’s only hope for salvation, the Athenians waived their claim to command in the interest of national survival.

Arriving at Artemisium, the Greeks panicked when they discovered that the Persian fleet anchored at Aphetae on the opposite coast was much more formidable than they expected. They immediately made plans to quit and retreat to the Isthmus of Corinth, where they could defend the Peloponnese. The Euboeans begged Eurybiades to remain long enough for them to evacuate their women and children from the island. He refused, and the Euboeans then bribed the Athenian commander Themistocles to persuade Eurybiades to make a stand at Artemisium. Themistocles gave Eurybiades and the Corinthian squadron leader a portion of the bribe he had received, pretending it was a personal gift, winning their support for a naval battle.

The Persians, hoping to decimate the small Greek fleet, sent a squadron of 200 ships down the east coast of Euboea with orders to double back around the island to take the Greeks from the rear. This would pin the Greek fleet between the two Persian contingents. Informed of the maneuver by a Persian deserter, the Greeks decided to attack the main Persian squadron the following evening in order to test the enemy’s seamanship and tactics. Against the larger and faster Persian fleet, the Greeks drew their vessels into a circle with the prows facing outward and succeeded in capturing 30 Persian ships in the closely confined fight that followed.

That evening a violent thunderstorm swept through, terrifying the Persian sailors, who were already shocked at their handling by the Greeks. The detachment that was sailing around Euboea was driven onto rocks and wrecked by the storm; Herodotus opines that “God was indeed doing everything possible to reduce the superiority of the Persian fleet and bring it down to the size of the Greek” (455). The next day, the Greeks received a reinforcement of 53 ships from Athens and attacked the Persian squadron again, destroying some Cilician vessels. The following day, the Persians, fearful of another embarrassing showing, took the initiative and attempted to surround the Greek fleet. Herodotus notes that the two sides were evenly matched on this third day of the battle; the Persian superiority in numbers proved its downfall, however, as the Persian ships continually ran afoul of each other, creating confusion. Losses of men and ships were heavy for both sides, but the Persian casualties were much greater. Half the Athenian ships were damaged, and after recovering the bodies and performing salvage operations, the Greeks decided to withdraw further south. At this moment, a messenger arrived with news of the Greek defeat at Thermopylae, and the Hellenic fleet immediately got underway.

It occurred to Themistocles that if the Ionians and Carians defected from the Persian fleet, the Greek confederacy would have a much greater chance of defeating Xerxes at sea. He had messages inscribed on many of the islands as he headed south, encouraging the Ionians to honor their filial ties with Athens and abandon Xerxes’ expedition, or at least refrain from damaging Greek vessels in the upcoming engagement. Once the Hellenic fleet departed Artemisium, the Persians took possession of the area. Xerxes invited his troops and marines on Euboea to visit the battlefield of Thermopylae, to which they were ferried by Persian vessels. He arranged to conceal the number of Persian casualties on the battlefield by having 9,000 corpses buried in shallow trenches while 1,000 were left in sight. This fooled no one, Herodotus claims, because the Persian dead had evidently been rearranged, while the Greek bodies were strewn over the plain adjoining the pass, lying where they fell.

The Persian army then continued its march south, guided by Thessalians. The Thessalians encouraged Xerxes to destroy their neighbors, the Phocians, with whom they had long been on hostile terms. The Phocians escaped into the mountains and surrounding countryside, but the Persians systematically burned and pillaged the towns and temples of Phocis and the adjacent communities as they advanced. Xerxes then split his army into two columns; the larger division proceeded with the king through Boeotia toward Athens, while the other division made for Delphi with orders to plunder its temples and bring the treasure to Xerxes.

The terrified Delphians asked the oracle of Apollo whether they should bury or flee with its sacred treasures. The priestess replied that the god would protect his property, whereupon the Delphians abandoned the town except for the oracle’s priest and 60 men. Several portents then occurred: Sacred weapons miraculously appeared lying in front of the shrine, and lightning bolts dislodged two huge pinnacles of rock from Mount Parnassus, which fell upon the advancing Persian troops, killing many of them. The panicked Persian soldiers fled and were set upon by the Delphians, who slaughtered a great number of the enemy. Herodotus reports that the Persians saw two gigantic hoplites pursuing them, ancestral heroes of Delphi, and that he himself saw the boulders that had fallen from Parnassus upon the Persian detachment.

 

Meanwhile, the Greek fleet arrived at Salamis, at the Athenians’ request, to evacuate their women and children from Athens. In short order, their families were relocated to Aegina, Salamis, and the Peloponnesian town of Troezen. Herodotus reports that the total number of Greek ships assembled at Salamis, excluding the smaller vessels, was 378, of which the Athenians supplied half. Eurybiades called a council of the allied naval commanders to decide where to engage the enemy in the territory still under Greek control. The consensus of the Peloponnesian officers was to sail to the Isthmus of Corinth to protect the Peloponnese, as Attica had already been abandoned to the Persians. During the council’s deliberation, a messenger arrived with the news that the Persians were burning Attica with wholesale devastation. A small number of Athenians who had remained behind during the evacuation barricaded themselves on the Acropolis and were slaughtered by the Persians, who then burned the citadel after stripping the temples of their treasures. A sacred olive-tree, the gift of Athena to the city, was destroyed in the fire; the next day, however, it was discovered that a new shoot had sprouted from its stump.

News of the burning of Athens caused widespread panic among the Greek fleet anchored at Salamis. The Peloponnesian commanders voted to withdraw immediately to defend the Isthmus, which now lay only a few days’ march away for Xerxes’ army. That night, an Athenian cornered Themistocles and implored the general to persuade Eurybiades to stay at Salamis, arguing that once the fleet departed, the individual squadrons would return to their home ports and the military alliance would fall into total dissolution. Themistocles agreed that the salvation of Greece depended upon engaging and defeating the Persian fleet at their present location. Convincing Eurybiades that the council should be reconvened, he argued that fighting at Salamis offered several advantages to the Greeks: its confined waters favored the superior maneuverability and tactics of the Greek fleet; defending Salamis would protect the Athenian refugees transported to the island; and a victory at Salamis would prevent the Persian army from marching to the Isthmus of Corinth.

 

By retreating to the Isthmus, Salamis, Aegina, and Megara would be forfeited to the enemy, and the Greeks would be drawing the Persian army toward the very location they wished to defend. Themistocles concluded by threatening to withdraw the Athenian squadron from the confederation and relocate the Athenian population to Italy if Eurybiades refused to fight. Realizing that the alliance would be unable to repel the Persian forces without the aid of the Athenian fleet, Eurybiades agreed to remain at Salamis. The decision was met with a portent: The next morning an earthquake was felt, and the Greeks prayed to the gods and called upon their ancestral heroes from Aegina—Ajax, Telamon, and Peleus—to support them in the upcoming strife.

Meanwhile, the Persian fleet sailed south from Euboea and assembled at Phaleron, the port of Athens, which lay across a narrow strait from Salamis. Xerxes’ army had been reinforced by men from the captive Greek states he had overrun—Boeotians, Locrians, Malians, and Dorians—which offset the losses of his infantry at Thermopylae and fleet at Artemisium. At Phaleron, Xerxes assembled a council of his naval lieutenants and asked them whether engaging the Greek fleet was advisable. All were unanimously in favor of attack, except Artemisia, who felt that the risk was too great. She argued that a naval battle was unnecessary, and that the superior seamanship of the Greeks could lead to a defeat that would jeopardize the Persian army and its means of retreat, i.e., the bridges over the Hellespont. Xerxes was pleased with Artemisia’s council but sided with the majority of his commanders. He ordered the Persian fleet to put to sea and prepared to watch the upcoming battle from Mount Aigaleo, a hill overlooking the narrows.

The Greeks were greatly alarmed, particularly the Peloponnesians, who rebelled at the idea of fighting at Salamis for Athenian territory while their homeland lay unprotected. A Persian victory at Salamis would cut off the Greek fleet, trapping the survivors on the island where they would be besieged. Indeed, that night the Persian infantry began marching toward the Peloponnese. The Peloponnesians who had remained behind were busy fortifying the Isthmus of Corinth, under the leadership of Cleombrotus, brother of Leonidas, in the expectation that the alliance’s fleet would be unable to assist them.

The tension among the Greeks at Salamis broke open, with the Peloponnesians demanding Eurybiades immediately withdraw the fleet while the Athenians, Aeginetans, and Megarians insisted it should stay and defend the current position. When it became clear that Themistocles was losing the dispute, he secretly sent a servant to the Persian camp, professing the Athenian commander’s admiration for the Persian king. The servant declared that Themistocles hoped the Persians would prevail, and that they should attack immediately, as the Greeks were at each other’s throats and preparing to flee. The Persian commanders, thinking the message credible, deployed their ships that night to surround Salamis and landed troops on an adjacent island where they expected the shipwrecked Greeks to wash ashore.

Meanwhile, as the Greek commanders were fiercely disputing what to do, an eminent Athenian who had just crossed over from Aegina reported to Themistocles that the Persian fleet was now surrounding Salamis. Themistocles encouraged him to announce this to the Peloponnesian generals, admitting he had hoped that by deceiving the Persians into taking this action, he would compel the Greek fleet to fight in a desperate, unified fashion. Initially, the Peloponnesians refused to believe the news; when it became obvious that their position was encircled, however, the Greeks prepared for battle.

The next morning, Themistocles exhorted the crews and marines to choose the better course of action and bring honor to themselves, and the Greek ships put out to face the Persians. The battle was intense, but the orderly discipline of the Greeks enabled them to outmaneuver their Persian counterparts, whose tactics were disorganized and haphazard. Herodotus reports the Persians fought bravely, however, out of fear of Xerxes, who was watching the battle. At one point, Artemisia, pursued by an Athenian warship, purposely rammed a Persian ship in front of her, breaking off the attack by confusing her pursuer. During the confusion among the Persians, some Phoenicians whose ships had been destroyed slandered the Ionians before Xerxes, claiming that the latter were traitors. At that moment, a Samothracian ship that had just sunk an Athenian vessel was rammed by an Aeginetan ship. From the deck of their sinking ship, the Samothracians hurled javelins at the Aeginetans, and boarded and seized their vessel. Seeing this display of Ionian valor, Xerxes turned to the Phoenicians and angrily ordered that they be beheaded for slandering their betters.

Many Persians were unable to swim and drowned during the battle; the Greeks, who were good swimmers, lost far fewer men. The Athenians and Aeginetans destroyed many enemy vessels during the chaotic action; the surviving Persian ships fled to Phaleron. Herodotus reports that the Greeks credited the Aeginetans and Athenians with the greatest exhibition of valor at Salamis. The Athenians claimed that the Corinthians panicked and fled at the very beginning of the battle, but the rest of Greece testified that the Corinthians fought nobly. During the battle, the Athenian who informed Themistocles that Salamis had been surrounded by the Persian fleet landed a small band of Athenian troops and murdered all the Persians that had occupied the little island off the coast of Salamis.

Realizing the severity of the disaster that had occurred, Xerxes feared the Greek fleet would sail to the Hellespont and destroy the bridges, trapping his army in Europe. He made plans to escape, but to conceal his intention from his own troops and the Greeks, he began to construct a causeway to Salamis by lashing together merchantmen vessels. By this and other means he persuaded the Greeks and Persians alike that he intended to fight again at sea. Mardonius, however, guessed the king’s actual design and realized that he himself would be blamed for the failure of the campaign and punished for persuading Xerxes to undertake it. Accordingly, he proposed that the king either immediately attack the Peloponnese, or, if he wished to return to Asia, allow Mardonius to select 300,000 of the best Persian soldiers with which to subdue the rest of Greece. Xerxes was delighted with the proposal and sought Artemisia’s advice as to the best option to pursue. Artemisia urged the king to return to Asia, confident in the victories he had already won—particularly the burning of Athens—and grant Mardonius the army he requested. Should Mardonius prevail in Greece, the glory would be Xerxes’; if he failed, he would bring dishonor only upon himself.

Xerxes agreed with Artemisia and instructed Mardonius to choose the troops he wanted. Meanwhile, the Persian fleet departed Phalerum that night, making top speed for the Hellespont in order to guard the bridges for Xerxes’ retreat. The next morning, discovering that the Persian squadrons had escaped, the Greeks resolved to pursue them. Failing to catch sight of them, Themistocles suggested that the Greeks sail immediately for the Hellespont and destroy the bridges. Eurybiades objected, arguing that Xerxes should be allowed to leave Europe, if he so wished, rather than confine him to the continent where the Persian army would continue to wreak havoc and possibly subdue all of Greece. Enabling Xerxes to escape, the Greeks could pursue the war the following year in Asia, rather than on their native soil.

Realizing the Peloponnesians supported Eurybiades’ position, Themistocles shifted ground and tried to mollify the Athenians who were outraged by the prospect of letting Xerxes slip away unpunished. He agreed with Eurybiades, intending to lay the groundwork for a future claim upon Xerxes. Immediately after the decision was made not to pursue the Persian fleet, Themistocles sent a messenger to the king, who was still in Attica, informing him that the Athenian commander had prevented the Greeks from destroying the bridges over the Hellespont. By means of this action, the messenger claimed, Themistocles wished to show he served the king’s interests and Xerxes’ retreat could proceed without interference. Themistocles then used the fleet to blockade Andros and the surrounding islands whose inhabitants had supported Xerxes, demanding payment as reparation for their treachery. He managed to extort money secretly from many of the islanders unbeknownst to the other naval commanders.

A few days after the Battle of Salamis, Xerxes’ army began its retreat, marching northward through Boeotia to Thessaly by the same route it had taken on its advance. Mardonius accompanied the king as far as Thessaly, deciding to winter there and resume the campaign the following spring. He hand-picked 300,000 troops to remain with him: the elite Persian infantry corps known as “The Immortals,” the Persian cavalry and spearmen, and detachments drawn from the Mede, Egyptian, Bactrian, Sacae, and Indian contingents of Xerxes’ army. Xerxes proceeded with the rest of his forces to the Hellespont at top speed, arriving in 45 days, but with only a fraction of his army intact. They were reduced to stripping bark and leaves from trees for food, and many died of starvation, dysentery, and plague during the march. Finding the bridges over the Hellespont had been destroyed by storms, the Persians crossed over to Asia by boat where many more died by glutting their appetites. The remnant proceeded to Sardis with Xerxes.

Meanwhile, the Greek fleet returned to Salamis and divided the plunder taken in battle, dedicating three Phoenician triremes to the gods in gratitude, and sending other trophies to Delphi. The fleet then sailed to the Isthmus of Corinth, where the commanders voted to award a prize of valor to the man who by common assent most distinguished himself by his conduct during the campaign. Each one voted for himself, but all awarded second place to Themistocles. As a result, no one got more than one vote for first place, but Themistocles was the unanimous choice for second. Due to the mutual jealousy of the Greek commanders, Herodotus reports, no award was made but Themistocles’ name was on everyone’s lips. Themistocles then went to Sparta, hoping to receive an honor there. He was given a magnificent welcome, and though the Spartans awarded the prize for valor to Eurybiades, Themistocles was given a wreath of olive for his wisdom and cleverness and awarded a splendid chariot.

The surviving Persian fleet, after ferrying Xerxes’ army to Asia, mustered the following spring at Samos. Thoroughly discouraged by their defeat at Salamis, the Persian naval commanders opted to remain at Samos to guard against a possible Ionian revolt. Meanwhile, representatives from Ionia arrived in Aegina, requesting the Greek fleet come to their aid. The Greeks, now commanded by the Spartan Leotychides, outfitted an expedition which, however, sailed only as far as Delos.

Herodotus notes that the Greeks were fearful that the eastern Aegean was full of Persians. Both the Greek and Persian fleets were afraid of encountering each other, and “their mutual fears stood sentry over the intervening area” (493). While Mardonius was wintering in Thessaly, he sent an envoy to collect oracles from many religious sanctuaries, hoping for advice for his campaign. The envoy returned with a message that prompted Mardonius to seek to make amends, and form an alliance, with the Athenians. Mardonius, hoping to avail himself of the Athenian fleet against the Peloponnesians, sent a Macedonian with diplomatic ties to Athens to address the Athenian assembly on his behalf. The ambassador declared that Xerxes would allow the Athenians to repossess all their land, take whatever other territories they wanted, have self-government, and receive Persian aid to rebuild their temples and buildings if they agreed to terms with the Persian king.

The Spartans, hearing that Mardonius was trying to forge an alliance with the Athenians against the rest of Greece, immediately sent envoys to Athens to counter Mardonius’ proposition. The Spartans offered to support the Athenian women and noncombatants at their own expense for the remainder of the war and reminded the Athenians that they were originally responsible for the Persian king’s enmity toward Greece. After the Spartan envoys spoke, the Athenians answered Mardonius’ ambassador: “So long as the sun keeps its present course in the sky, we Athenians will never make peace with Xerxes. On the contrary, we shall oppose him unremittingly, putting our trust in the help of the gods and heroes whom he despised, whose temples and statues he destroyed with fire” (497). Dismissing the Persian envoy with these words, the Athenians then thanked the Spartans for their kindness and urged them to mobilize their army as quickly as possible, expecting that Mardonius would invade Attica as soon he heard that the Athenians had rebuffed his overture.

Book 8 Analysis

Book 8 describes the naval battles of Artemisium and Salamis, and the withdrawal of Xerxes to Asia after the defeat of the Persian fleet at Salamis. These events, occurring between the summer of 480 BCE and the winter of 479 BCE, form the dramatic climax of the Histories. The Greek confederacy, on the verge of collapse after the defeat at Thermopylae and Xerxes’ subsequent destruction of Athens, wins a decisive victory at Salamis that shatters the Persian king’s confidence in the invincibility of his forces’ numerical superiority and compels his retreat from Greece. The Book emphasizes the critical role of the Athenian fleet and Greek naval tactics in repelling the Persian invader. It also highlights the ever-present internecine tensions that threatened to destroy the fragile Greek alliance, a danger that was overcome by the wily stratagems of the Athenian general Themistocles at Artemisium and Salamis. In the course of a suspenseful narrative of military action and flight, Herodotus provides a portrait of the ethically complex, brilliant, and unscrupulous Themistocles, whose determination, foresight, and political acumen were largely responsible for the salvation of Greece.

In Book 7, Herodotus argues that the Athenians’ commitment to building a navy and choosing to defend Attica by sea, rather than capitulate to Xerxes, were the primary reasons the Greeks were able to repulse the Persian invasion. In Book 8, he describes the maritime warfare tactics that enabled the Greek allies to overcome the superior size and speed of the Persian fleet, particularly its Phoenician squadron, which, with its fastest ships and most experienced sailors was the heart of Xerxes’ armada. While the independent Greek city-states were unable to mobilize an infantry of adequate size to halt the Persian advance at Thermopylae, the allies enjoyed a three-fold naval advantage fighting in the confined waters of Artemisium and Salamis: more effective organization, superior maneuvering capability of their smaller ships, and a better understanding of the strategic opportunities and maritime conditions of the waters in which they chose to engage the enemy.

During the fifth century BCE, naval warfare largely consisted of ramming and sinking an enemy vessel or boarding and engaging in hand-to-hand combat by armed marines. Rowing skill and power were paramount, because the ability to change direction quickly and strike an enemy vessel broadside with force was the primary method of attack. At Artemisium, the Greek fleet drew into a tight circle, with prows outfacing, preventing their vessels from being rammed by the surrounding Persian ships. Maintaining formation, the Greeks fought effectively, capturing 30 enemy vessels before nightfall. The prevailing winds and currents carried the wreckage northward toward the beach at Aphetae where the Persians were encamped, entangling the oars and prows of the enemy ships.

At Artemisium and especially Salamis, the scale of the Persian fleet, and the larger size of its vessels, proved a liability. Herodotus notes that on the final day of the Battle of Artemisium, the sheer number of Persian ships created confusion, as they continually fouled and collided with each other. After the Greek fleet withdrew to Salamis to evacuate Athens, Themistocles realized that the narrow straits surrounding the island offered a tactical advantage to the smaller and more maneuverable Greek ships, which would be negated on the open sea. Herodotus notes that when the vanguard of the Persian fleet began to backwater at Salamis, it collided with the second and third lines of ships behind it, creating chaos that the Greeks quickly exploited with closely coordinated attack maneuvers of their triremes.

Herodotus’ description of the Battle of Salamis is his most detailed account of a naval engagement, but the information he provides is spotty and occasionally questionable. The Athenian playwright Aeschylus, who fought during Xerxes’ campaign and may have taken part in the battle, offers a nearly contemporaneous account of the engagement in his tragedy The Persians, performed eight years later. Their descriptions differ in several respects, including the number of ships on each side and the opening maneuvers of the engagement.

Due to the contemporary conditions of maritime warfare, no one participating in the battle could have had a full view of the action, though presumably Xerxes enjoyed a panoramic vantage point on Mount Aigaleo. That said, Herodotus’ sources likely included survivors of the battle, and as a native of Halicarnassus, his description of Artemisia’s role must have relied upon information about the Halicarnassian queen gathered from Persian sources. Herodotus does not say how many ships each side lost; scholars estimate 200-300 Persian vessels were destroyed or damaged, while the Greeks lost about 40 ships.

The Greek victory at Salamis marked the decisive turning point in the war with Xerxes, forcing him into the compromised position that Artemisia had prophesied before the battle. Realizing that Xerxes desired a resounding triumph over the Greek fleet, Themistocles lured him into an engagement that tactically favored the Greeks, though, as Artemisia had warned the king, the battle was not a strategic necessity for the Persians. Seen retrospectively, Salamis inaugurated Athens’ subsequent rise to supremacy among the Greek city-states, establishing it as the foremost naval power in the Aegean, a position that was steadfastly spearheaded by the efforts of Themistocles.

Themistocles’ decisive role in Athenian politics, the building of the Athenian fleet, and the Greek confederacy’s naval defense was both aided and complicated by his ambition and opportunism, qualities that color Herodotus’ narrative of his actions. Sagacious, shrewd, and politically astute, Themistocles realized that in order to counter their powerful rivals, the Aeginetans, economically and militarily, the Athenians needed a powerful fleet. He convinced the Athenians to donate the public funds derived from the Attic silver mines toward the construction of 200 warships; these formed the basis of the fleet eventually used to defend Greece from the Persians and which evacuated the inhabitants of Athens after Xerxes invaded Attica. Similarly, Themistocles persuaded the Athenians that the Delphic oracle’s ambiguous phrase, “[T]he wooden wall shall not fail,” indicated that salvation would be found in their ships, and the oracle’s invocation of “Divine Salamis” meant the god intended the Athenians would defeat the enemy in the waters surrounding the island. In dealing with Spartan general Eurybiades, the Corinthian commander Adeimantus, and the rest of the resistant Peloponnesians, Themistocles employed bribery, subterfuge, and the threat of withdrawing the Athenian fleet to force the Greeks to fight at Artemisium and Salamis, going so far as to secretly encourage the Persians to surround the Greek position before the latter battle to prevent their flight.

The late first-century BCE Greek historian Plutarch writes that Themistocles’ ambition, populism, and innovativeness incurred the enmity of many powerful Athenian leaders for constantly inciting the people to new adventures. As a youth during Darius’ campaign against Greece, the “trophy of Miltiades would not let him sleep”; hungry for glory, he foresaw that Marathon was the beginning, not the end, of a great war. Plutarch depicts Themistocles as avaricious and unscrupulous, a claim supported by Herodotus’ assertion that after the victory at Salamis, he used the fleet to extort money secretly from the Cycladic islanders who sided with Xerxes.

Plutarch also reports that Themistocles intended to burn the fleets of Athens’ allies after Xerxes’ defeat, thereby guaranteeing Athenian supremacy at sea. Similarly, he notes that Themistocles’ greatest achievement was resolving all the civil wars among the Greeks and persuading them to lay aside their enmity during the great conflict with Xerxes. Always alert to the uncertainty of his political future, Themistocles sought to secure the personal favor of Xerxes while vigorously defending Greek independence and Athenian interests. It was a prescient policy, as he eventually sought refuge at the Persian court of Xerxes’ son Artaxerxes after being ostracized by the Athenians in 472 BCE. He was given the governorship of Magnesia, where he died by his own hand, Plutarch reports, rather than support the king in a military action against the Athenians.

Many scholars reject as unhistorical Herodotus’ report that the Athenian Mnesiphilus provided Themistocles with the arguments he used to persuade Eurybiades to remain at Salamis. Reflecting an anti-Themistoclean bias, the anecdote is often seen as an attempt to discredit the insight and originality of the Athenian leader by his enemies. At the same time, it grafts a prominent Herodotean motif onto Themistocles’ story; the most foresighted and cleverest of the Greeks is himself warned by a fellow Athenian as to the danger of abandoning Salamis. As is true of the Histories throughout, Herodotus’ depiction of Themistocles is influenced by purely literary concerns as well as the biases of his sources; the general comes to symbolize the pragmatic brilliance and patriotism of the Athenians as well as the ethical duplicity associated with individualism.

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