Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations

Soldiers are subject to attack at any time during wartime, yet soldiers are hesitant to shoot other combatants when they are not engaged in threatening activities, especially when they are performing normal activities, such as eating or bathing. There is no rule against shooting them in these instances, but the moral reluctance to do so highlights soldiers’ implicit recognition of another’s human rights when that person is not posing a threat. Of course, some soldiers would kill an enemy caught unawares regardless and even commit other acts of cruelty, but Walzer’s point is that, because people have moral impulses even in a situation in which killing is permitted, it is possible to apply rules about just conduct to warfare.

One issue is the distinction between people in occupations that blur the line between combatants and noncombatants. For example, munitions workers are considered combatants but only when engaged in that job, and it is preferable to stop munitions production without harming the workers if at all possible. People who produce food or other non-military goods for soldiers are not legitimate targets because such goods can also be used by the general population, whereas munitions are solely used for war. Walzer uses the example of submarine warfare to demonstrate how merchant ships carrying weapons have been treated as combatants. However, if a vessel is sunk, wounded and helpless combatants are entitled to the assistance of the enemy unless the battle is ongoing. When the Laconia was sunk by a German submarine, the commander initially ordered a rescue when he realized that the families of British soldiers and 1,800 Italian prisoners of war were on board. However, when the Allies bombed the area, the commander ordered his men to rescue only the Italians, leaving the women and children to perish. Walzer argues that a rescue can be broken off temporarily in the case of attack but not called off, as was done here.

Noncombatants, per the war convention, are not to be attacked. Yet there is a way of reconciling this absolute prohibition with military necessity, called the double effect. Noncombatants can be killed if four conditions hold, specifically, the act is a legitimate act of war, the direct effect is morally acceptable such as the killing of soldiers, the actor’s intentions are good as he aims only at an acceptable effect, and the good effect is sufficient to compensate for or is proportional to the evil done (153). Walzer takes issue with the third condition, the actor’s intentions, and proposes a revision to the principle. It is not enough to not intend the deaths of civilians. There must instead be a double intention, for the good achieved and to reduce evil as much as possible, and the military must accept costs and risks to ensure this reduction of evil. The degree of risk will vary in each situation and is a matter of judgment, but there are standards. Walzer gives the example of the Free French Air Force in World War II choosing to fly bombing missions at low altitude so as to minimize civilian deaths. He additionally cites the decision of Norwegian commandos to stop the heavy production of water needed for an atomic bomb on the ground at significant risk and cost to soldiers versus via a bombing raid, which would endanger civilians.

The oldest form of total war, sieges condemn noncombatants to death before soldiers. In a siege, an entire city is encircled and deprived of food, with starvation as the result. Cruel as it is, this form of warfare is not prohibited by the current rules of war. In the siege of Jerusalem in 72 AD, the military commander Titus “ordered that any Jews who fled the city were to be crucified” (165). Morality, per Walzer, dictates that civilians be given the opportunity to leave. Those defending the city must also not coerce civilians to stay. Likewise, during the siege of Leningrad in World War II, the German commander ordered any Russians trying to escape the city to be shot. Despite the fact that approximately one million civilians died during this siege, the German commander was acquitted of war crimes.

Walzer argues that coercion and consent are critical to the culpability of those involved in siege warfare. Combatants “are under an obligation to help civilians leave the scene of battle” (169). He argues that this obligation remains in siege warfare. Civilians must be offered free exit even if that means the military can hold out longer in the city.

Walzer also condemns the siege of a country via a blockade and the strategic devastation of food resources serving civilians. He cites the British blockade of Germany in World War I, noting that it resulted in mass malnutrition of the civilian population. Civilians were impacted first, and that is morally unacceptable. Naval blockades and strategic devastation are only acceptable if “adequate provision” (174) has been made for civilians.

In guerrilla warfare, ambush and surprise are key tactics. Walzer cites the example of French partisans ambushing German soldiers during World War II. The Germans assumed themselves to be in a safe area because the French had surrendered. Yet partisans, disguised as peasants and Frenchmen, opened fire on them. What, Walzer asks, is the meaning of surrender if citizens of a defeated state can continue fighting? He concludes that while resistance is legitimate, the punishment of such resistance is legitimate as well. Guerrilla warfare challenges the distinction between soldiers and civilians, and if the partisans do not respect that distinction, there danger that the aggressor could disregard it too and punish whole villages.

Typically, guerrillas seek the support of the population by making the enemy seem evil. They invite their enemies to attack civilians but do not do so themselves. Counterattacks rather than aggressive or unprovoked attacks win over supporters. Mao’s “Eight Points for Attention” is indicative of the guerrilla strategy to win hearts and minds, as it commands that guerrillas be polite and refrain from property damage and taking advantage of women, among other things (181). The war rights of guerrillas are dependent upon the level of popular support that they command because the local population determines whether the guerrillas’ cause is legitimate or not.

The tactics of guerrilla warfare violate the war convention as they blur the line between combatants and noncombatants. Walzer observes that the nature of guerrilla tactics is more akin to espionage and sabotage carried out behind enemy lines (184), and agents engaged in such tactics are not entitled to war rights. However, Walzer argues that guerrillas acquire war rights with the growth of their popular support. Without popular support, they are criminals with no war rights. With significant popular support, they gain the right to the benevolent quarantine offered to prisoners of war as long as they are not guilty of acts for which soldiers can be punished (186). Once popular support is substantial, the enemy is wrong to continue the fight. Only counter-insurgency campaigns can isolate guerrillas from the civilian population to ensure there is little or no collateral damage. If that separation is not possible, the war is unjust.

Walzer uses the example of Vietnam as a counter-insurgency war that should have been stopped. American policies were ineffective and required the resettlement of a substantial portion of the rural population. They failed to distinguish combatants from noncombatants and instead gave significance to the distinction between those loyal and disloyal to the regime, which was a political rather than a military consideration: Civilian supporters of guerrillas who provide only political support are not legitimate military targets. In guerrilla warfare, there is an intimate relationship between the fighters and civilians. They live among the populace and are dependent upon civilians for their needs and safety. When the populace wholeheartedly backs the guerrillas, considerations of jus ad bellum and jus in bello come together. The war becomes unjust as it can only be won via a war against civilians (196). This was the case in Vietnam.

Terrorism targets innocent people deliberately to instill fear. It is a violation of the war convention, and its increasing use demonstrates a breakdown of an accepted political code. Walzer traces its emergence, contrasting its form with a previous revolutionary code of honor. He cites three examples of “so-called terrorists” (198) who did not target people indiscriminately. Russian revolutionaries called off an assassination when the target appeared with his children; the Stern Gang, a right-wing Zionist group, declined to shoot a police constable after completing an assassination; and the Irish Republican Army was horrified in the late 1930s when a bomb went off in the wrong location and killed civilians. In violation of the war code, these revolutionaries considered it morally acceptable to kill political agents, but they did not target random civilians.

The Vietcong defined enemies more broadly to include anyone who was paid by the government as well as landowners and priests, yet they too did not kill indiscriminately. By contrast, in the Battle of Algiers, Europeans were killed at random. Walzer argues that revolutionary struggle “cannot consist of terrorist attacks upon children” (205), and revolutionaries can earn freedom by directly attacking enemies and refraining from attacking others. That political code is the only path to self-respect (206).

The doctrine of reprisals legitimates criminal actions if they are undertaken “in response to crimes previously committed by the enemy” (207). According to Walzer, they are the part of the war convention most prone to abuse. The purpose of reprisals is to respond to a wrongdoing that has taken place to prevent further aggression. While reprisals sometimes have this effect, it is not always the case. An example of their effectiveness, though not their moral acceptability, is when the French Forces of the Interior executed 80 German POWs in response to German executions of partisans. Afterward, the Germans stopped executing captured partisans.

Walzer condemns reprisals that target civilians because they are often out of proportion to the inciting attack. He recommends backward-looking proportionality, in which reprisals are limited with reference to previous crimes and not the crimes they hope to deter (211). Such rules would have criminalized the killing of German prisoners of war. If these two rules are followed, reprisals are acceptable as a matter of last resort after diplomacy has failed. He cites an example of an acceptable reprisal: Winston Churchill promised a reprisal if the Germans used poison gas, an appropriate action to reduce barbarism in war. Another acceptable reprisal was when, in response to a terrorist attack on a plane killing civilians, Israel destroyed empty planes in Beirut. This was a limited military action, with soldiers crossing boundaries but quickly returning and not endangering civilians. Walzer notes that there is a state between peace and war called the demi-monde, characterized by “periods of insurgency, border strife” (216), and other tensions. Reprisals, as a first resort to force, can potentially stave off war at such times.