83 pages • 2 hours read
Naomi Oreskes, Erik M. ConwayA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Throughout the narrative, conservative think tanks arise as a medium through which these scientists disseminate misinformation. These organizations, such as the Marshall Institute, represent the simulacrum of science, using graphs, charts, references, and reports to convince both the public and the White House of the lack of need for government regulation. However, these organizations are not subject to peer review. Essentially, they can propagate whatever reports they want and misuse statistics and other evidence in whatever way they please:
This was the Bad Science strategy in a nutshell: plant complaints in op-ed pieces, in letters to the editor, and in articles in mainstream journals to whom you’d supplied the ‘facts,’ and then quote them as if they really were facts. Quote, in fact, yourself. A perfect rhetorical circle. A mass media echo chamber of your own construction (147).
Mainstream science does not take these organizations seriously, as they are not subjected to the same rigorous standards of proof as academic science. Despite this fact, many of the merchants of doubt have close ties to these organizations, suing their scientific bona fides to garner authority within these institutions.
Most tellingly, many of these institutions are indirectly funded via various corporations and industries. Most of the alleged research—which is no more than a compilation of non-contextualized quotations from unidentified sources—is used to garner support for the aims of various industries:
‘Possibly PM [Phillip Morris] could provide funding, through Federal Focus, to the George C Marshall Institute…they could address the ETS conclusion…I think the Marshall Institute will have considerable credibility since it does not take funding from private companies nor the government. It is funded solely through foundations such as Federal Focus’ (148).
The industries, such as the tobacco company Phillip Morris, used the scientific credibility of these think tanks and their associations with merchants of doubt such as Fred Seitz to attain their political goals. They felt that government regulation would severely hurt the success of their businesses, and so they funded these conservative, pro-free market think tanks to create reports and disseminate information which simulated science and cast doubt on the veracity of mainstream scientific conclusions, such as the idea that smoking causes cancer.
Secrecy is an integral aspect in the lives of these merchants of doubt. Many of these scientists were involved in weapons programs during World War II and the Cold War—indeed, Jastrow, Nierenberg, Seitz, and Singer all worked with classified military technology at some point during their research—and so they were used to their research being labeled as top secret:“During the Manhattan Project, and throughout the Cold War, for security reasons many scientists had to hide the true nature of their work” (214).
These men had to create cover stories for their friends which sometimes had no basis in reality. As such, the authors repeatedly suggest that these men became used to lying about their work, seeing cover-ups as integral to national security. In regard to combatting who they viewed as environmental watermelons—green on the outside, red on the inside—“Seitz, Singer, and Nierenberg continued to act as if the Cold War had not ended” (214). Rather, they continued the pattern of secrecy in their work, especially when editing or altering the nature of various Executive Summaries. They attempted to obfuscate the truth of mainstream science’s belief in acid rain, among other issues, by incorrectly summarizing the report, thereby keeping secret the true conclusions of the report.
This pattern of secrecy also aligned itself with the aims of corporate industries, who wanted their businesses to succeed and desired that offending science be kept secret. To maintain the secrecy of their goals—the perpetuation of their product—they sent secret memos regarding business plans to obfuscate the truth of scientific evidence. To further lend these claims credulity, they secretly funded conservative think tanks which, as aforementioned, created and disseminated reports arguing against government regulation. The secrecy learned in times of war was reinstated by corporations and conservative scientists alike to advance their political goals.
Much of the information that was disseminated by think tanks and the merchants of doubt would not have been able to have the intended effect without the complicity of the mass media. Although some conservative media outlets blatantly reiterated the narratives given to them by the industries and various White House administrations, most of the media outlets were merely complicit due to their ignorance concerning these scientific issues: “The mass media became complicit, as a wide spectrum of the media…felt obligated to treat these issues as scientific controversies” (214). The media believed that due to the Fairness Doctrine—which required television “dedicate airtime to controversial issues of public concern in a balanced manner” (19)—they were required to provide the contrarians with an equal amount of coverage to the mainstream science, creating the appearance of more dissent than there actually was. Instead of painting the picture of a few outlier scientists who were misrepresenting—or, in some cases doctoring—the scientific evidence, the media represented the issues as a widespread debate.
Often, this was not entirely the media’s fault, as sometimes they were even threatened by these scientists and organizations into creating the appearance of a debate. During the debate on SDI, the SDI lobby replayed the tobacco strategy: “they began urging journalists to ‘balance’ their reports on SDI by giving equal time to the Marshall Institute’s views. When they didn’t, Jastrow threatened them, invoking the Fairness Doctrine” (57). The media failed to differentiate between good and bad science and good and bad scientists, paying more attention to the scientific bona fides of individuals they considered to be authorities than actually listening to the leading experts—and expert organizations—in the field. The merchants of doubt knew how to play the media, as many of them had had extensive dealings with the media in the past. As such, they were familiar faces that leant credibility to these extremist views. To appear unbiased, the media ended up creating bias against mainstream science within the American public.
Much of the narratives concerning the merchants of doubt directly deal with the evident hypocrisy these men abided by. In almost every case, these merchants of doubt accused mainstream academic science of the faults for which they were culpable. Throughout these debates, the conservative scientists accused environmentalists of being overly political and allowing their political goals to cloud the evidence. However, in every case the same could be—and more aptly was—said for the conservative scientists: they were so hell-bent on preventing the slippery slope of socialism that they used any means at their disposal by which to prevent government regulation: “Evidently accepting that their ends justified their means, they embraced the tactics of their enemy, the very things they had hated Soviet Communism for: its lies, its deceit, its denial of the very realities it had created” (238). They appropriated a kind of utilitarianism within their pseudoscience, ultimately becoming the very thing they believed they were fighting against. In fact, they caused science to become more inextricable from politics and vice versa even as they lambasted their scientific colleagues for being biased.
Of course, a main idea that arises throughout the narrative is one of misinformation, as we see the public being misled by these scientists, the think tanks, and the industries via the media for the better part of a half of a century in every one of these instances. Misinformation is, after all, the crux of the narrative. However, the true problem with misinformation—at least, as the authors present it—lies not merely in the misinformation itself but in its continued propagation: “The Internet has created an information hall of mirrors, where any claim, no matter how preposterous, can be multiplied indefinitely. And on the internet, disinformation never dies” (240).
Despite a wealth of knowledge via the Internet, there are still those who maintain that Rachel Carson is a murderer, that anthropogenic global warming does not exist, that cigarettes do not affect one’s risk of cancer. Therefore, the danger of misinformation lies not in the misinformation itself, but in the fact that it is designed and perpetuated in such a way as to create the appearance of doubt. Misinformation makes people less sure of scientific evidence, of science and even history, allowing people with specific political and economic aims to capitalize on the ignorance of other people while maintaining the secrecy of their own aims. In short, misinformation is dangerous because it allows for the obfuscation of truth at no cost to its propagators. In this way, it represents a very solid business venture indeed.