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62 pages 2 hours read

Roméo Dallaire

Shake Hands with the Devil

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2003

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Chapters 13-15Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Chapter 13 Summary: “Accountants of the Slaughter”

The UN watered down Dallaire’s plan for UNAMIR 2 and released it as Resolution 918, which was “vague on the genocide and the role the force should play in stopping it” (374). Even so, the member states of the UN did not send troops to reinforce UNAMIR, with the United States insisting that “African security problems should be solved by African troops” (374). While some African nations were willing to help, they lacked the logistics needed to deploy their own soldiers. The UN also refused Dallaire’s request to shut down RTLM through either jamming its signal or with air strikes. The United States and the UK only provided UNAMIR 2 with antiquated vehicles that quickly broke down. Still, Dallaire continued efforts to transport survivors from the Hôtel de Mille Collines and other refugees to safety.

The RTLM was explicitly calling for Dallaire’s assassination because of his efforts to help Tutsis trapped on RGF territory and the lie that he was planning to export orphans from Rwanda. Meanwhile, Dallaire found a recording of a meeting between Colonel Bagosora and humanitarian workers which served as proof that Bagosora was involved in directing the “genocidal militia” (386).

The RPF occupied Kigali, which “had become a ghost town” (388). People who had been hiding in Kigali came out for help from the RPF. However, the Presidential Guards and the Interahamwe were disguising themselves as RPF soldiers and killing them. Meanwhile, Hutu refugees were moving west into impoverished and hostile regions. This concerned Dallaire since, if the Hutu refugees reached Zaire, the refugee camps would be run by the extremists, a scenario that could destabilize the entire region.

A group of sick children were evacuated from Rwanda, but the connecting flight was not ready and the children were left on the plane in Nairobi on a hot day, with one of the children dying. The event was worse PR for the mission in the media. At the same time, a plane carrying an Italian minister was nearly destroyed in an attack launched by the RGF. Larger numbers of people were entering the UNAMIR compounds.

In other incidents, a French journalist was struck by a bullet. UNAMIR failed to evacuate a group of orphans from a Kigame orphanage. There was a massacre in Kabgayi, where RPF soldiers went rogue and killed an archbishop, three bishops, and ten priests in revenge for the Hutu massacres, regarding the Catholic Church as an ally of President Habyarimana and the old government.

Dallaire left for Nairobi to ask for more supplies from the UN and to meet his wife, Beth, who flew in from Canada to see him. However, he had little time to meet with her because he had to speak with diplomats and humanitarian groups. During the meetings, he cautioned them not to deal directly with the RPF, since it would give the RGF an excuse not to deal with them. At the same time, under pressure since the RPF denounced him, Booh-Booh resigned.

Chapter 14 Summary: “The Turquoise Invasion”

Kouchner returned to Kigali with news that France would launch a joint French and Franco-African force into Rwanda to stop the genocide, which would have a “chapter seven” mandate from the UN. Dallaire strongly opposed the plan: Since the French historically supported the RGF, he feared that a French intervention would rally the extremist forces. The French mission was to be called “Operation Turquoise.”

Dallaire struggled to work with the RPF, who became more suspicious of UNAMIR as a result of the news of a French intervention. The RPF detained a group of wounded MILOBs who had hit a mine, preventing them from receiving immediate medical care. The RPF also started attacking peacekeepers as an indirect result of the RGF using UN vehicles that had been abandoned after breaking down. Dallaire assured Kagame that he would try to leave Kigali in his control.

By June 19, UNAMIR should have had 4,600 soldiers, but only had 503 (432). In addition, Dallaire was asked to assume political duties previously handled by Booh-Booh. Dallaire proposed to the UN the following options: that UNAMIR either withdraw and allow the French to handle the entire situation; get the RGF and RPF to agree to a French military presence while keeping UNAMIR as a go-between; or redeploy UNAMIR into Rwanda after the French completed Operation Turquoise. Dallaire recommended that the French only come if the RPF consented, and if not, then to make UNAMIR withdraw and come back at a later date.

The RPF became hostile to Franco-African soldiers after the announcement of Operation Turquoise, forcing their withdrawal. Despite this setback, the French forces promised to avoid Kigali and the war zone between the RPF and RGF. The citizens of Rwanda excitedly welcomed the French. Dallaire was afraid, though, that the operation would cause a “resurgence of the genocide” (437) since RTLM promoted the view that the French would fight the RPF.

On behalf of officers and staff evacuating to Nairobi, Dallaire hosted a medals ceremony. Later, Dallaire met the French officers. “Some of these officers came from the colonial tradition of military intervention in the domestic affairs of former client states; they saw no reason to change their views over what they billed as one more interethnic squabble” while others did seem “genuinely motivated by humanitarianism” (451). Many of the soldiers from France were misinformed and mistakenly believed that the RPF was responsible for the genocide, not the RGF. In one incident, a French battalion rescued hundreds of Tutsis. While they were finding transport, the Tutsis were slaughtered by the Interahamwe, leading to disillusionment: “As Opération Turquoise continued, more and more French soldiers experienced similar incidents and became disgusted with their role in Rwanda” (451-452).

Dallaire became the intermediary between the RPF and the French. The French would prevent the genocide in the Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ), the area of Rwanda secured by the French military. It was agreed the French would not go outside the HPZ. Dallaire asked the French to use their resources to get the message out that Operation Turquoise was not working to reinforce the RGF.

Meanwhile, the Security Council passed Resolution 935, which established a committee to investigate “’possible acts of genocide in Rwanda” (454). There were problems with Operation Turquoise, however. The RPF ambushed a French convoy carrying refugees, although luckily the incident ended peacefully. In another situation, a French officer, Colonel Thibault, who had been a military adviser to the TGF, announced he would attack the RPF if they came near the HGZ, which was a public relations coup. Still, by July 4th, the RGF had completely withdrawn from Kigali and retreated to western Rwanda.

Chapter 15 Summary: “Too Much, Too Late”

A ward in King Faisal Hospital was locked to contain those who participated in the genocide and the RPF “wanted them to live to face the courts instead of lynch mobs” (462), which Dallaire saw as a victory for humanitarianism. The RPF became prepared to work toward a ceasefire and help UNAMIR move the French out of the HPZ. The RPF agreed to set up a new government founded on the Arusha Accords, but with the added provision that anyone found guilty of participating in genocide would not be allowed to hold political office. By July 12th, the RPF formally accepted the Arusha Agreement, but with “no amnesty for members of the old regime or the military implicated in the genocide—they would face the full penalty of the law” (467). Faustin Twagiramungu would become the new Prime Minister, and the new President was Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu who had once been tortured under President Habyarimana’s regime.

Still, the damage caused by the genocide and the war festered. At one point, Dallaire saw a group of children clearly marked by trauma: “Many of the kids were so psychologically damaged that they were immobile, sitting here, there and everywhere and reacting to nothing, even the hundreds of flies that clustered at every orifice of their bruised, dirty and frail bodies” (467).

The U.S. government finally acted to remove representatives of the old extremist interim government from the UN. However, Dallaire notes that U.S. President Bill Clinton lied with his claim that the U.S. had taken a “leading role” in helping Rwanda (472). Dallaire found that Tutsi refugees from Uganda began to occupy the city, even taking over the homes of Hutus, which led him to “dire thoughts” such as “whether the campaign and the genocide had been orchestrated to clear the way for Rwanda’s return to the pre-1959 status quo in which Tutsis had called all the shots” (476).

Slowly, the refugee sites emptied out and the damage began to be calculated: “With almost ten percent of the pre-war population murdered in a hundred days, there were very few families who did not lose at least one member” (478). Dallaire could not help but resent how dignitaries and celebrities began to flood into Rwanda, horrified by their insensitivity towards what had taken place. He describes “the photo ops they arranged of themselves beside mass graves” and how they were “able to step over bodies without seeming to notice those people had once had names” (491). He admits he took delight in making UNAMIR’s guests eat the same expired German rations they had had to depend on for months.

The U.S. began to send massive amounts of aid into the country. Violence continued against refugees coming into the country, while relief efforts were still hampered by the reluctance of foreign governments to risk the lives of personnel. Dallaire decided to leave his command earlier than planned after a certain incident. He decided to buy a few goats and keep them as pets. When a group of wild dogs attacked the goats, he fired wildly at the dogs, driving them off. The staff was worried: “They said nothing but the message was clear: ‘The General is losing it’” (501). After saying his goodbyes, he returned to Canada: “Just like other casualties, I needed to be evacuated. There was no guilt in that” (509).

Chapters 13-15 Analysis

Although by this stage serious relief and humanitarian efforts had come into Rwanda, Dallaire cannot help but express disillusionment and bitterness in these chapters. No small part of this was the continued issue of Bureaucracy and Political Needs versus Humanitarian Intervention. With Kagame and the RPF, Dallaire speculates that they exploited the tragedy in some way: “I came to believe [Kagame] didn’t want the situation to stabilize until he had won” (438). Likewise, the United States’ representatives in Rwanda, such as Lieutenant General Daniel Schroeder, were still hindered in their ability to provide aid. Aid efforts by foreign nations in Rwanda were dominated by the “no-risk approach” (497) demanded by their governments.

Besides the problems constantly faced by UNAMIR still persisted even as the political situation in Rwanda stabilized, Dallaire was also faced by the devaluing of his and UNAMIR’s previous efforts. President Bill Clinton falsely claimed credit for leading relief efforts (472). On the ground, Dallaire felt that the people who arrived to help after the genocide were “well-meaning,” but he had the feeling they were “outsiders” (491-492). However, Dallaire admits that he and his staff had been so molded by their experiences in more difficult times that they were, to some degree, alienated from the newcomers. This is just one example of the mental health costs faced not only by the native Rwandans who survived the genocide, but also by Dallaire and his troops and staff. Ultimately, it was Dallaire’s mental health that drove him to finally leave his mission, even before the time he was originally supposed to leave his post.

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