Shake Hands with the Devil

Dallaire was disappointed when he found that the “process of mission approval and troop deployment” (80) in Rwanda would take three months. Although Dallaire was able to get a small force of 2,600 soldiers with armored vehicles, he struggled to get them ammunition and supplies, a problem that would never resolve during his time in Rwanda. The United States, a powerful voice on the UN’s Security Council, “never took Rwanda or me seriously; their position continued to be that the job could be done with much fewer personnel” (84). It was difficult to rally support for Rwanda among the member nations of the UN, including Dallaire’s home country, Canada because, “Rwanda was on nobody’s radar as a place of strategic interest. It had no natural resources and no geographical significance” (89). Only Belgium, Rwanda’s former colonizer state, showed a willingness to get closely involved. Dallaire found an ally in Dr. Abdul Hamid Kabia, a diplomat from Sierra Leone and the political officer of the Rwanda mission.

The UN’s plan for Rwanda was laid out in phases. Phase One involved the withdrawal of French military forces that were seen as the RGF’s allies, turning the capital city of Kigali into a weapons-free zone. The United Nations would begin monitoring the demilitarized zone for outbreaks of violence. Phase Two would see a 2,548-member force occupy the demilitarized zone while the RPF and the RGF demobilized, and Phase Three would involve “the actual demobilization and reintegration process and would last ten months” (88). The fourth (and final) phase would introduce democratic elections. The UN assumed the process would be rapid and straightforward: “In UN terms, the mission was to be small, cheap, short and sweet” (89). Following a trip to speak with officials in Uganda about the mission, Dallaire felt as if the world governments were much better informed about political developments in Rwanda than he was. Dallaire claims that “[n]ot one country was willing to provide the UN or even me personally with accurate and up-to-date information” (90).

Dallaire set up headquarters at the Hôtel des Mille Collines in Kigali, receiving vehicles and local drivers. Nonetheless, supplies remained an issue for Dallaire, and he clashed frequently with the Chief Administration Officer, Per Hallqvist.

Another problem was RTLM, the “hardline radio station” that promoted anti-Tutsi “racist hype” (101). Dallaire had to handle diplomatic problems and promote UNAMIR’s activities to the Rwandan public while “forced to fight a petty internal war over vehicles and office supplies” (107). In order to spread awareness of the mission, Dallaire conducted a UN flag-raising ceremony at the village of Kinihira, where most of the peace negotiations were taking place. President Habyarimana and members of his political party (MRND), did not attend. Dallaire saw their absence as a “deliberate slight to UNAMIR” (104). However, when UNAMIR’s headquarters were opened at Amahoro Stadium in Kigali, President Habyarimana gave a speech promoting UNAMIR.

Ominous signs remained. In neighboring Burundi, the democratic government, led by a Hutu, was overthrown by Tutsi military officers. The coup had an immediate negative impact on Rwanda: “Kigali was thick with rumours and suspicion, and the local media was full of hysterical talk of Tutsi hegemony” (98). Meanwhile, the burgomaster (mayor) of the town of Nkumba reported that 21 men, women, and children were killed and two people were kidnapped, all associated with the MRND. The Rwandan media blamed the RPF. After the government neglected to investigate, UNAMIR attempted to probe the massacre without success. UNAMIR’s “failure to find the perpetrators of the November 17 to 18 massacre became ‘proof’ for the hard-liners that UNAMIR was biased against the regime and was a closet RPF supporter” (112). Another massacre blamed on the RPF took place in a village in northwestern Rwanda.

UNAMIR was reinforced by Belgian soldiers who had racist attitudes toward the Rwandans, which Dallaire tried to quell with a speech. Jean-Jacques Booh-Booh, a diplomat from Cameroon who was appointed the head of UNAMIR, “turned out to be a proper gentleman who kept diplomatic working hours” (118)—meaning he worked few hours, refused to work on weekends, and was not involved in dealing with the massacres. When Dallaire discovered that the November 17/18 massacre was carried out by RGF commandos, Booh-Booh refused to authorize an operation since it “might further jeopardize the political process” (122).

Further negotiations were to take place at Kinihira on December 10, but they did not go far. The situation grew increasingly tense, as “there was an increasingly violent tone to political discourse, fed by the broadcasts of RTLM” (123). Meanwhile, Dallaire was busy trying to impose the KWSA (Kigali Weapons Secure Area) agreement, which proved difficult to enforce since the RGF continued moving weapons just outside the KWSA. Dallaire also worked on Operation Clean Corridor, which would provide a secure route for RPF representatives to enter Kigali. Dallaire disagreed with the decision to hold negotiations for the new government, called the Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG) at the National Council for Development (CND) where the National Assembly of Rwanda met, since it would look like the RDF was occupying the center of Rwandan politics. Despite these obstacles, Dallaire was pleased with the mission’s progress.