Shake Hands with the Devil

Augustin Bizimana approached Dallaire on behalf of Habyarimana’s government, wanting to work with UNAMIR and make the Gendarmerie stop the violence. Dallaire was surprised by Bizimana’s “dramatic change of attitude” (169) and believed it was because he was visited by the U.S. Secretary of State for international organizations, Doug Bennett. However, while Bennett listened to Dallaire, it did not result in the United States offering more resources.

Dallaire remained annoyed that the United Nations Department of Peace Relations did not provide more resources for public relations, making it difficult to “build on the desire of the vast majority of Rwandans” (172) for peace. At the same time, Dallaire unsuccessfully pressed for riot gear to give to the Gendarmerie and for the assistance of legal advisors to help with investigations into the November 17/18 massacres and human rights professionals to address ethnic violence in Rwanda. Because of the political stalemate, the World Bank threatened to cut off funds to Rwanda, which “could lead to a total economic collapse” (174). The uncertainty over funding made the process of demilitarization more difficult.

Per Hallqvist resigned after he was made to request expensive cars and furniture for Booh-Booh and his staff. “His resignation couldn’t have happened at a worse time” (176) since it dealt a blow to Dallaire’s own efforts to secure supplies for his soldiers. Another attempt to install the BBTG was made, but the MRND representatives did not show up. Booh-Booh stormed out of the meeting and an angry crowd whipped up by the Interahamwe and the Presidential Guards, Habyarimana’s own security force, protested outside. The political parties present would not agree to Dallaire’s idea to swear in the political representatives who were available, out of fear that Hutu Power would take the opportunity to grab seats on the new National Assembly.

Dallaire continued having problems with the discipline of the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR. They went to nightclubs without regard for their safety, got drunk on patrol, started fights with locals, and refused to salute officers from other contingents, especially officers of color. The Belgian soldiers fraternized with Tutsi women, something seized upon by the media and which Dallaire regarded as a form of sexual exploitation: “As far as I’m concerned, there is no such thing as consensual sex between soldiers and the local civilian population in a war or conflict zone” (184). The issues with the Belgians exploded when a group of Belgian soldiers broke into the home of one of the leaders of the extremist CDR family, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and beat him and threatened to kill him if he insulted Belgium or Belgians again. “Barayagwiza immediately went public and wiped out any of the hard-won public sympathy we had achieved earlier in the month” (184). The perpetrators were never found, and the actions of the troops were even defended by their commander, Colonel Roman.

Tensions also continued to build among Rwanda’s politicians. At a banquet attended by foreign dignitaries, conversations avoided mentioning the failure to install the BBTG. During the dinner, a Hutu moderate, Félicien Gatabazi, got into an argument with members of the MRND about their extremism. He insulted them, blaming them for the political deadlock and accusing the Presidential Guards of training militias. After the dinner, Faustin Twagiramungu’s car was ambushed and one of his bodyguards was killed. Later, demonstrators affiliated with the extremist Coalition for the Defense of the Republic Party (CDR) burst into Madame Agathe’s offices and took eight hostages. While UNAMIR troops and the Gendarmerie managed to save the hostages, Félician Gatabazi was assassinated in a separate incident. Dallaire thinks this assassination was “the spark that set the whole country ablaze” (188).

Mobs took over the streets of Kigali and politicians went into hiding. Attempts to find out who assassinated Gatabazi failed, with most Rwandans blaming the CDR. One mob lynched Martin Bucyana, the president of the CDR, and the Interahamwe retaliated by blocking all roads in and out of Kigali. In the midst of the chaos, Dallaire consulted with Madame Agathe, who “was close to tears” and “begged [him] not to take away the guards that [were] stationed at the homes of the moderates” (189). The MRND cabinet ministers refused to attend meetings she scheduled and ignored her phone calls.

Dallaire placed heavy security at Gatabazi’s funeral. On the way there and back, he and UNAMIR were met by cheering crowds. This inspired Dallaire to try again to “launch a campaign to reach out to the local population and win their support” (196). With Luc Marchal, he gave a press conference attacking RTLM and its “relentless anti-Arusha and anti-Tutsi rhetoric” (197). Meanwhile, an African MILOB (Military Observer) began visiting schools in remote, rural Rwanda and noticed that at some schools, teachers were registering their Tutsi and Hutu students and seating them separately. Dallaire writes, “We mistakenly assumed that this was just another example of ethnicity at play in Rwanda” (198).

Both the RGF and the RPF began increasing their military activities, instead of demilitarizing according to the Arusha Accords. Kagame assured Dallaire that he would give him a warning if fighting between the RPF and the RGF resumed, but because the Belgian contingent had behaved so badly, Dallaire “wasn’t sure if [he] could take him at his word” (201). Dallaire met with President Habyarimana, who concentrated his forces in the demilitarized zone against the “increasingly aggressive RPF” (202).

Nevertheless, there was progress on the political front. The diplomatic community put pressure on the RPF to agree to yet another date for swearing in members of the BBTG. Dallaire felt confident enough to return to Canada briefly to visit his family in March. The French government tried to have him dismissed from his command, apparently because of his reports on the presence of French officers among the Presidential Guard with ties to the Interahamwe. He was still backed by the Canadian government and the DPKO.

The installation of the BBTG was delayed again when President Habyarimana insisted against the moderates that members of the CDR be included. Faustin and Madame Agathe announced on the radio that the BBTG would finally be installed on March 25 and read out the names of the candidates for the ministry and representatives for the new National Assembly. The plans broke down once the RPF refused to attend either on March 25th or the 28th. Meanwhile, Booh-Booh accepted an invitation from Habyarimana to spend the Easter weekend at his retreat. Dallaire argued that this would make it look like UNAMIR was on the side of the government and the RGF, but Booh-Booh countered this might give him insights into the government’s plans.

The contributions from UN member-states in terms of supplies, ammunition, and troops continued to be lacking, even from Canada. At an Easter celebration, Marshal spoke with Colonel Bagosora, one of the RGF commanders, who openly advocated genocide, claiming “the only way to deal with the Tutsis was to eliminate them completely” (219).

Back in New York City, 15 delegates in the UN—including a known Rwandan extremist—released Resolution 909, which would give a deadline of six weeks to install the BBTG. If not, then the mission would likely effectively end. At the same time, UNAMIR was asked to reduce costs, even though Dallaire was already operating on a budget far smaller than the budget for operations in the former Yugoslavia. Dallaire balked at the thought of planning a withdrawal.