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Edward GibbonA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Next, Gibbon turns to the topic of Rome’s politics. Gibbon describes the Roman Empire by the second century CE as a monarchy. He remarks that monarchy inevitably turns into “despotism” unless there is a check on the monarchy, like a strong clergy, nobility, or a “stubborn commons” (59).
Rome had been a republic, but the empire essentially became a monarchy in all but name with the rise of Julius Caesar’s great-nephew, Octavianus, who became the first emperor, Augustus. The Senate of Rome voted to give Augustus significant powers over the government. Still, Augustus took absolute power while still maintaining the charade of restoring the republic after decades of civil war. Roman generals also generally had tremendous power over their soldiers. When Augustus came to power, he entrusted military responsibilities to his chosen lieutenants.
Still, Augustus adopted the powers of many of the old political offices of the republic, like the censor (who oversaw public morality and state finances), the consul (the executive office, like a president or prime minister), the tribune (who was the people’s representative), and the pontiff (the high priest). Nonetheless, elections continued to happen, and the old offices of the republic continued to exist, even retaining some of their old civic responsibilities. The Senate of Rome also stayed in place, but it lost much of its old legislative and judicial power.
While the emperors still took on the image of republican politicians, they were also deified. This was an adaptation of a custom of making kings into gods after their deaths that had developed in the Greek-speaking world. The Senate would deify popular emperors. However, this was more of a formality, and the treatment of their divinity eventually “sunk into oblivion” (70). The threat to the political system Augustus built was the army, which could have overturned the whole empire at any time. Gibbon argues that Augustus tried to solve this problem by using the “majesty of the senate” (72) as a barrier between the army and the emperor. Since Augustus, emperors were made legitimate by both the “authority of the senate and the consent of the soldiers” (73, emphasis Gibbon’s). Another problem with Augustus’s system was that there were no real rules of succession: Emperors would try to deal with this by nominating and sharing power with their preferred successor during their lifetime.
Gibbon recounts how the succession of emperors unfolded since the downfall of Nero, the last emperor from Augustus’s dynasty. After a civil war in which three separate emperors were propped up and killed in the course of a year, a general from the lower classes named Vespasian became emperor. With his son Titus, he established a new imperial dynasty, the Flavians. This dynasty soon came to an end with the assassination of Titus’s brother and successor, Domitian. The new emperor, an elderly man named Nerva, adopted a successor from outside his own family, Trajan. In turn, Trajan nominated a cousin to succeed him, Hadrian.
After Hadrian’s preferred successor and lover Aelius Verus died, Hadrian would choose as his successor Antoninus Pius, who was also prompted to adopt the then-teenager Marcus Aurelius as his son. Gibbon deems the era from the start of Nerva’s reign to the death of Marcus Aurelius as the peak of not only the Roman Empire, but the time when “the human race was most happy and prosperous” (78). Still, Gibbon argues that the imperial office also gave power to not just good rulers like Antoninus Pius, but also tyrants like Caligula and Nero.
Even though Gibbon argues that the culture of the Roman Empire held ideals concerning “the dignity of human nature and the origin of civil society” (80), he also argues that the Roman emperors had a tyrannical power with no equal in his own day. In the Europe of Gibbon’s time, people could escape a tyrannical government by fleeing to a neighboring country that would not be so different from their homeland. At the height of the Roman Empire, there was no such easy escape from the emperor’s authority.
Just as Gibbon views the time from the rise of Nerva to the death of Marcus Aurelius as the golden age of the Roman Empire, he also suggests the fall of the Roman Empire began with Marcus Aurelius’s son and successor, Commodus.
Referring to Commodus’s “monstrous vices” (84), Gibbon argues that Commodus’s tyranny was because he “had nothing to wish, and everything to enjoy” (85). Gibbon summarizes how ancient sources describe Commodus’s reign. After Marcus Aurelius died, Commodus’s reign began with his flattering advisors convincing him to abandon the war his father had been fighting against the Germanic tribes, the Quadi and the Marcomanni. Still, at first the government of the empire under Commodus ran itself well. Then, an assassin tried to kill Commodus, shouting, “The Senate sends you this!” (87). It was a plot by Commodus’s own sister Lucilla, who wanted to install her husband Claudius Pompeianus as emperor. She was exiled and later killed, but nonetheless, Commodus became paranoid, especially toward the Senate. He ordered a number of executions of senators without any proof of conspiracy.
At the same time, Commodus caved to the military. The legions of Britain managed to easily pressure Commodus into executing one of his chief ministers, Perennis. This taught the military how weak the central government could be. In Perennis’s place, Commodus elevated a corrupt lackey named Cleander. When Rome was hit by a famine and a plague, Cleander was blamed for profiting off the sale of grain. When a riot broke out, another sister of Commodus, Fadilla, and his lover, Marcia, convinced him to have Cleander killed. Otherwise, Gibbon describes how Commodus was uninterested in the business of government, preferring luxury and sex.
Presenting himself like the ancient hero Hercules, Commodus even fought in gladiatorial battles: “In all these exhibitions, the surest precautions were used to protect the person of the Roman Hercules from the desperate spring of any savage who might possibly disregard the dignity of the emperor and the sanctity of the god” (94). His cruelty frightened his own servants, so his mistress Marcia, his praetorian prefect Laetus, and his chamberlain Eclectus drugged him and had him strangled by a wrestler.
Laetus convinced Pertinax, the prefect of the city who had a good reputation, to declare himself the next emperor to the praetorian guard. Right away, Pertinax worked to reverse the government corruption that had festered on Commodus’s watch. He also eased the tax burden and sold off in a public auction the luxurious goods collected by Commodus. Pertinax was popular with the public, but not with the praetorian guard, who resented the fact that Pertinax was planning to deal with them more strictly and with less generosity. After a couple of failed attempts to elevate a new emperor, the praetorian guard assassinated Pertinax.
With these chapters, Gibbon concludes his analysis of the Roman Empire at its height and begins discussing what he presents as the turning point in the decline, the reign of Emperor Commodus. Although Gibbon does discuss the personalities and actions of individual emperors extensively, these chapters also show how Gibbon writes and analyzes history in a very modern way by discussing the broader social, cultural, and economic forces of history.
Gibbon calls attention to the political system established by Augustus and how that system worked for various emperors until the time of Septimius Severus. This is the period modern Roman historians call “the Principate,” which comes from the Latin term princeps, meaning “first among equals,” and from which English gets the word “prince.” Gibbon says about the policy of Augustus, “It was more agreeable to his temper, as well as to his policy, to reign under the venerable names of ancient magistracy, and artfully to collect in his own person all the scattered rays of civil jurisdiction” (64). However, Gibbon still deems Augustus a “subtle tyrant” (70). Gibbon argues later that this period in Roman imperial history came to an end with the reforms of Septimius Severus, who made the imperial office more of what we would consider a military dictatorship.
There were emperors like Caligula or Nero who were overthrown under the Augustinian system. Still, modern historians tend to agree that emperors like Caligula or Nero failed because they were seen as breaking with the system Augustus had carefully set up. For example, by insisting on his own personal godhood, Caligula upset the delicate balance between the republican remnants of the government and the monarch-like power of the emperor. As for Commodus, it was not that Commodus was a uniquely bad emperor. Instead, his regime and downfall exposed and worsened several problems, namely the role of the military, especially the dependence of the emperors on the good will of the military, the power of the praetorian guard over the very lives of the emperors, and the lack of a system for orderly succession from one emperor to the next. These flaws composed the “mortal poison” that “lurked in the vitals of the constitution” (122) that Gibbon will describe in a later chapter.
Besides the political reforms of Augustus, Gibbon also sees the beginning of the decline in terms of his views on “West” versus “East.” Gibbon argues that politics in Persia was always shaped by authoritarian governments, something he also sees as reinforced by the later influence of Islam (79-80). At the same time, Gibbon argues that the Romans had an innate inclination to “revere a free, a virtuous, and a victorious commonwealth” (80). It was only under the emperors that the Romans came to accept what Gibbon views as tyranny.
While Gibbon attributes an inherent interest in liberty to both Roman politics and Greek philosophy, it is unclear where exactly Gibbon draws the boundaries between the liberty-preferring West and the tyrannical East. This is especially vague because Gibbon describes Greek philosophy as encouraging ideas of a free society, but Gibbon also blames the Greeks of Asia for developing what would become the “servile and impious” (68-69) practice of deifying emperors. Regardless, this will form the basis of one of Gibbon’s recurring arguments: that the formerly staunchly republican Romans were corrupted not only by the tyranny of their emperors, but by influences from the Eastern provinces.
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