The Discourses

“Also, this must be taken as a general rule: that never or rarely does it happen that a republic or a kingdom is organized well from the beginning or is completely reformed apart from its old institutions, unless it is organized by one man alone; or rather, it is necessary for a single man to be the one who gives it shape, and from whose mind any such organization derives.”

A city is composed of all its people, who have various desires and viewpoints. Only a great leader can cut through the noise, make the needed changes, and establish a republic in the face of the chaos that otherwise would reign. Since great men are rare, it is more common that states in transition will fall to the will of a tyrant. Either way, believes Machiavelli, nothing new will happen without the power of a single person to direct the change. 

“The salvation of a republic or a kingdom is not, therefore, merely to have a prince who governs prudently while he lives, but rather one who organizes the government in such a way that after his death it can be maintained.”

Chief among Machiavelli’s principles is that a great leader must institutionalize the virtues he has espoused so they can persist after he is gone. Otherwise, a state will quickly decline back into the chaos or tyranny in which he found it. 

“Hence, one can draw this conclusion: that where the material is not corrupt, disturbances and other disorders can do no harm, and where the material is corrupt, carefully enacted laws do no good, unless they are initiated by a man who, with enormous power, causes them to be observed in such a way that the material becomes good.”

An uncorrupted people can withstand crises. Once corrupted, however, a people cease to be a republic and become prey to tyrants. The process of corruption takes generations, and only a great leader has the strength to undo the damage and return the city to its origins, but this is difficult and rare. 

“Thus, just as good customs require laws in order to be maintained, so laws require good customs in order to be observed.”

A republic needs a foundation of laws and customs to protect the people and their freedoms. Laws are ignored unless the citizens are habituated toward obeying them, both by the rule of law and by social and religious habits that comport with the laws. Romans early on share these habits; they act as one in expanding the wealth and power of their city. 

“Contemporary princes and modern republics who lack their own troops for either defense or offence should be ashamed of themselves.”

Simply because a republic is, by nature, virtuous does not mean it is exempt from the cold reality of world affairs, where predators lurk, their fangs and talons made of armies. Though a republic may wish to be on good terms with its neighbors, it is best to be prepared, lest one or more of those neighbors become threats. The Roman Republic itself is a danger to its own neighbors; republicanism is no preventive against state ambition. 

“[I]f one establishes the habit of breaking the laws for good reasons, later on, under the same pretext, one can break them for bad reasons.”

Machiavelli’s basic thesis is that only a great leader can establish a republic or build one out of the ruins of a tyranny. To do this, the leader must break the rules. Once the new state is established, he must found institutions and precedents that uphold and protect the new rules and new way of life. On the other hand, a city can ruin itself by making constant exceptions to the rules, even in good causes, since this establishes a precedent of making exceptions, until a demagogue uses the precedent to overthrow the old guard and conquer the city. Two of Rome’s later leaders, Marius and Sulla, make exceptions to their own terms of office, which paves the way for Julius Caesar to declare himself dictator for life. 

“Rome’s neighbours, in seeking to conquer the city, caused it to create institutions that not only enabled it to defend itself but also to attack its neighbours with greater strength, better advice, and more authority.”

As with regular exercise that strengthens a body, constant attacks will strengthen a state, if the state can overcome them. Thereafter, the state knows how to behave under attack and can translate that knowledge into aggression and conquest. 

“But the worst defect weak republics can have is to be indecisive, so that all their decisions are taken out of necessity, and if any good comes to them, it comes through force of circumstance rather than through their own prudence.”

The Roman Republic is very good at being decisive, and they establish an empire. Florence and Venice, on the other hand, vacillate, act impulsively, and otherwise undermine themselves so that they make little progress in their military and diplomatic efforts. 

“When a people is led to commit the error of respecting a man because he might oppose those they despise, and when this man is shrewd, it will always happen that he will become tyrant of that city, because he will wait for the support of the people to destroy the nobility, and he will never turn to oppress the people before he has destroyed it: at the point where the people realize that they have been enslaved, they will have nowhere to take refuge. All those who have founded tyrannies in republics have employed this method.”

Demagogues begin by convincing the people that their rulers must be overthrown. In the chaos that results, the demagogue quickly takes command, alters institutions to suit him, and establishes his rule. By the time the people realize they have been duped by crass appeals to their emotions, the rulers who might have saved them are dead or exiled, and it is too late. 

“As King Ferdinand used to say, men often act like certain minor birds of prey who have such a strong desire to pursue their prey, being prompted by nature to do so, that they do not hear another larger bird flying above them who is about to kill them.”

Avid focus on one problem can blind people to a much larger problem that should be solved first but gets worse because of the obsession with the small problem. A people fixated on, for example, an insult from a minor city can fail to notice the shadow of an attacking empire looming up behind them. 

“It is not without reason that the voice of a people is compared with that of God, for it is obvious that popular opinion is wondrously effective in its predictions, to the extent that it seems to be able to foresee its own good and evil fortune through some occult power.”

Machiavelli’s viewpoint is quite modern, as it anticipates later theories about the wisdom of crowds and crowdsourcing. A large group will tend to moderate the more extreme viewpoints among its members and come to a reasonable consensus, whereas an autocrat has no one to stop his worst ideas from being realized. This is an argument in favor of republics over principalities. 

“The cruelties of the multitude are directed against those whom they fear will take possession of the public property; those of a prince are directed against anyone he fears will take possession of his own property.”

A republic behaves harshly in defense of the people as a whole; a prince behaves cruelly merely to protect himself. This is another argument in favor of republics over tyrannies, as republican governments exist to protect the citizens, while dictatorships protect only the dictator. 

“When men grow older, they lose strength but gain in judgement and prudence, and, of necessity, the things that seemed bearable and good in their youth later come to be unbearable and bad as they grow older, and although they ought to place the blame for this on their own judgement, they blame the times instead.”

The young are ambitious and full of energy; the old are battle weary and suspicious of the ambitious plans of their descendants. Thus, change often comes from the young, while the defense of basic principles tends to come from the old. 

“Thus, if I wish to wage war with a prince and between us there are firm pacts which have been observed over a lengthy period of time, I will attack one of his friends with another justification or another excuse, rather than attacking him, knowing full well that if I attack his friend he will either resent it, and I shall fulfill my intention of waging war upon him, or by not resenting it, he will reveal his weakness or lack of faith by not defending someone under his protection.”

A state may discover that it can defeat another and conquer it, but finds it is burdened by old treaties that no longer serve its purposes. If the state simply attacks, no one will ever again sign any pact with that power, but if it can irritate the target state indirectly, as by attacking the target’s ally, it may force the war it wants and still maintain its honor. 

“I must declare, therefore, that good soldiers are the sinew of war and not gold, because gold is an insufficient means of finding good soldiers, but good soldiers are a more than sufficient means of finding gold.”

Weapons and provisions are important to victory, but more important is an army’s spirit. Inspired and capable soldiers will find ways to win, and the spoils of war will quickly make up for any deficits in arms. 

“Once again I conclude, therefore, that the prince whose people are armed and organized for warfare should always wait at home for a violent and dangerous war and should not go out on the attack. But the prince who has unarmed subjects and a country unused to war should always go as far away from home as possible.”

If weak, an army should either stay at home, where it may do some good on defense, or else wage an assault far from home in case it loses, so that the victorious forces cannot immediately take the vanquished army’s city. 

“In substance, a government is nothing more than the control of subjects in such a way that they cannot and must not harm you; this is achieved either by making yourself completely safe from them, by taking away from them every means of doing you harm, or by bringing them benefits in such a way that it would not be reasonable for them to desire some change in fortune.”

A ruler who oppresses his people must guard against them constantly; a ruler who is loved by his people need guard only against ambitious courtiers. A terrorized people will not support the prince, while a happy people will rise up to protect him.

“It should, then, be considered whether fortresses are constructed to defend against one’s enemy or against one’s subjects. In the first case they are not necessary, in the second they are harmful.”

A fortress that protects the prince against his own people becomes a symbol of oppression; one that protects the prince against invaders is generally useless or worse when under siege. It is better to have well-trained standing armies for defense.

“When it governs itself in such a way that its neighbours are its tributaries in order to keep it friendly, this is a sure sign that such a state is powerful, but when these neighbours, even while inferior to it, take money from it, then this is a significant sign of its weakness.”

City-states like Florence who fail to study the ancients, especially the Romans and their empire, fall into weaknesses, such as letting their neighbors take advantage of them, which is costly and emboldens others to plot against them.

“[E]very prince should be warned that he will never live in security in his principality as long as those whom he deprived of it are alive.”

Even a good prince, who wishes to be just and merciful, must be ruthless toward his enemies, or those enemies, who never rest, will find ways to be ruthless toward the prince. Exile and imprisonment work better than kindness but less well than execution, which is the only means to remove utterly the danger. 

“It is evident that many more princes have lost their lives and their states through conspiracies than through open warfare, because being able to wage open war against a prince is within the reach of very few, while the possibility of conspiring against him is open to everyone.”

Only a prince has the power to wage a war on his own authority and expense, but his courtiers can plot against him at very little cost. Thus, it is much easier to conquer a state from within than to attack it from the outside. 

“It would be possible to demonstrate with a long discussion how much better are the fruits of poverty than of wealth and that poverty has honoured citizens, provinces, sects, while wealth has destroyed them, if this subject had not on many occasions been celebrated by other writers.”

People who work together in hardship to accomplish great things can be proud, but when those great things lead to luxury and idleness, the very spirit that creates them disappears. A once-noble populace descends into bickering while outsiders, watching hungrily, plan the wealthy state’s downfall.

“Since men judge things by their results, all the evil that comes about is blamed upon the one who gave the advice, and if things turn out well, he is commended for it; but the reward is far from counterbalancing the blame.”

The chief danger of being an advisor to commanders and kings is that, if the leaders take the advice and things go badly for any reason, the advisor will always be blamed and punished.