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Thomas J. SugrueA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Chapter 4 addresses racial discrimination in Detroit’s labor market. Although Black workers fared relatively well during the war, white workers consistently received preferential treatment on the job. Discriminatory hiring and promotion practices shaped the structure of the labor market. White workers performed skilled and semiskilled work, while Black workers toiled in subordinate unskilled jobs. Employers excluded entire groups of workers they deemed unsuitable for certain types of work, generally basing their decisions on racial stereotypes relating to reliability and productivity. Concern about the impact of racial integration also excluded Black workers from upper-level positions. Uncooperative managers and union leaders often stymied antidiscrimination government efforts. Although workplace discrimination was not universal or identical across industries, Black workers generally faced discrimination in the workplace, trapping them in the most insecure, lowest-paid jobs.
Screening by Race: Employment Agencies and Ads
Before Michigan passed the 1955 Fair Employment Practices Act, which outlawed discrimination based on race, color, and creed, employers typically included racial preferences in their job listings. Some employers even recruited white people from outside the state instead of hiring local Black workers. Employment agencies also screened job applicants by race. Agencies open to Black workers largely catered to people seeking domestic or service help.
The Automobile Industry
Automakers were Detroit’s biggest employers in the mid-20th century, accounting for a quarter of the city’s jobs (95). Jobs in the auto industry were stable, paid relatively well, and had attractive benefits, largely because of the UAW. Black people made up just 4% of auto workers at the outset of the war. This figure rose to 15% by 1945, but only to 16% by 1960 (95). Plant-level employment statistics underscore the unevenness of job opportunities for Black auto workers. Sugrue provides tables demonstrating that some companies hired many Black workers while others hired very few. Individual managers had the greatest impact on hiring practices, not plant location or education level. The biases of a single manager could bar all Black people from a company. Some plant managers worried about the disruptiveness of hiring Black people. Others complained that Black workers lacked loyalty, pointing to high turnover rates during the war. Companies that hired Black people tended to place them in unskilled or semiskilled positions, often in the most dangerous and dirtiest sections of the plant. Employers took advantage of Black workers, knowing they would accept jobs white people were likely to reject. At the Ford Wayne plant, for instance, Black workers were confined to difficult jobs on the assembly line and in the body shop, while white workers got “nice, easy, soft jobs” (100) in the cushion and trim departments. Black people were overrepresented in unstable positions that made them more susceptible to layoffs than white people, even when they had seniority. Moreover, despite the auto industry's strong tradition of apprenticeship programs, Black workers were almost entirely excluded from skilled trades, such as tool and die making.
Hiring Practices in Other Detroit Industries
Statistics reveal that the steel industry presented the best job opportunities for Black Detroiters outside the auto industry. In 1940, only 4.2% of Michigan’s steel workers were Black. By 1950, the figure rose to 17.9% (105). However, the percentage stagnated during the following decade. Like the auto industry, steel plants confined Black employees to low-paying, unskilled work. Statistics show that virtually no Black people found work as skilled craftspeople, the best-paying jobs in steel plants (104). Black employees were a small part of the workforce and were largely confined to dangerous furnace work or unskilled maintenance jobs. Like the UAW, the United Steelworkers of America (USW) supported civil-rights legislation, but the union was uneven in supporting racial equality in Detroit’s steel plants. Only two plants had a substantial Black workforce—Great Lakes Steel and Detroit Steel. However, Black employees tended not to be salaried, working for less secure hourly wages.
Hiring practices, combined with racism, shut Black people out of secondary sector industries and nonautomotive local industries, such as brewing. Many small, family-owned companies either discriminated openly against Black people or relied on referrals from current (i.e., white) employees, which promoted segregation. Black workers also faced obstacles in large companies, some of which had long histories of racial discrimination.
Municipal Employment
Detroit’s public sector was a promising employment arena for Black people after the war. In 1935, only 202 of the city’s 23,684 municipal employees were Black. By 1946, Black people comprised 36% of the workforce (110). Sugrue attributes this growth to the efforts of civil-rights activists, namely the Civil Rights Committee, which pressured the civic government to hire Black people. Mayor Edward Jeffries (elected in 1939) actively diversified the municipal workforce during the first three years of his tenure, in part to cement the loyalty of the city’s rapidly expanding Black population. His administration offered many opportunities for Black people beyond unskilled, part-time work. For example, Black people worked as train conductors, motormen, and clerks in the offices of Public Health, Housing, and Welfare. Moreover, by the late 1960s, almost half of the city’s public school teachers were Black. Policing, by contrast, remained predominantly white.
Retail Sales
High-visibility sales jobs offered few opportunities for Black workers in postwar Detroit. Statistics reveal that Black people were grossly underrepresented in sales jobs compared to white people. This is important because the retail sector accounted for one-seventh of the city’s male workers and over one-fifth of all female workers between 1950 and 1960 (112). Companies feared that hiring Black retail workers would alienate white customers. Store owners were also reluctant to break gender conventions by hiring Black men to work in stores that catered to white women. Fear of being robbed by Black employees also influenced hiring practices. Most Black people in retail worked behind the scenes in storerooms or in positions traditionally reserved for people of color (e.g., shoe shining). Grocery stores followed similar patterns.
Building Trades
Racial discrimination was most entrenched in Detroit’s building sector. The demand for construction workers skyrocketed in postwar Detroit, yet Black people were largely shut out of the industry, especially the skilled crafts, such as carpentry, roofing, and plumbing. Aside from the Laborers Union, Black people were also excluded from construction unions. Those who found work in construction did unskilled, ununionized work, making them vulnerable to layoffs. The barriers to union jobs began at basic levels; mere apprenticeship required a high-school diploma and thus excluded most Black migrants. Apprenticeship became more flexible after the war, but the rigorous application, interview, and testing process deterred many Black workers. Ten years after the state passed the Fair Employment Practices Act in 1955, Black people remained shut out of high-paying, skilled union jobs in construction (117).
Sugrue cites discrimination and the culture of construction to explain the exclusion of Black workers from the sector. Brotherhood and masculine identity were important facets of construction work. Unions nurtured this fraternal atmosphere. Moreover, contractors relied more heavily on personal references than other occupations, eschewing job ads and employment agencies in favor of referrals. Word of mouth fostered nepotism and ensured that the workforce remained predominantly white.
The Casual Labor Market
The casual labor market reinforced broader patterns of employment discrimination and trapped Black workers in a cycle of poverty. High unemployment among Black men forced them into exploitative, short-term jobs. For example, Black men worked as subcontractors for a fraction of the wages full-time white contractors received. Black subcontractors did not threaten the monopoly white men had over high wages. Further, they placed white contractors in supervisory roles, allowing them to be “temporary bosses.” Detroit’s Black day laborers gathered at an informal labor market on the outskirts of the city colloquially known as the “slave market,” where they waited for white contractors to hire them. These workers lacked job security and did the most arduous work on construction sites.
Casual Labor and the Construction of an “Underclass’
Detroit’s highly visible “slave market” reinforced racial discrimination and contributed to the construction of a racialized “underclass.” The market helped codify the image of the Black man loitering on a street corner, a potent symbol of poverty. Black men became associated with “self-defeat, personal failure, and hopelessness” (121). Street-corner culture was also associated with gangs and urban crime. These stereotypes about undependability and criminality then became rationalizations for discriminatory hiring practices. They also fueled beliefs about Black indolence, casting non-disabled but unemployed Black men as undeserving of public assistance and a threat to law and order.
Although this is outside the scope of Sugrue’s book, the artificial construction of a racialized underclass is a major theme in scholarship on mass incarceration and the War on Drugs. Although the discriminatory hiring and housing practices that led to Detroit’s decline are now illegal, many scholars argue that the War on Drugs has retrenched this racialized underclass under the guise of facially race-neutral laws impacting the formerly incarcerated. In her book The New Jim Crow, law professor Michelle Alexander writes, “Once you’re labeled a felon, the old forms of discrimination—employment discrimination, housing discrimination […]—are suddenly legal.” (Alexander, Michelle. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Era of Colorblindness. New York: The New Press. 2010).
The Continuing Significance of Discrimination
Black Detroiters faced employment discrimination in most industries throughout the mid-20th century. Although union activity and fair employment laws undermined workplace discrimination, Black people remained stuck in “the meanest and dirtiest jobs” (122). Discrimination in Detroit’s labor market had many causes, including personal bias. Internal labor-market decisions, fear of alienating white customers, and the competitive advantage of white workers also hindered Black advancement. Patterns of discrimination changed depending on the supply of and demand for labor, in relation to pressures from unions, and in response to contract provisions. Ultimately, Black workers did not have unlimited access to Detroit’s labor market. Opportunities for Black workers expanded in certain sectors over time, but these gains became scarcer in the postwar decades.
Chapter 5 focuses on postindustrial Detroit. Sugrue identifies the late 1940s to the 1960s as a turning point in the city’s development. The industrial landscape shifted drastically in this period. Plant closures led to mass layoffs. Between 1947 and 1963, the city lost 134,000 manufacturing jobs (126). Empty factories fell into disrepair. Service industries catering to factory workers, such as restaurants and taverns, closed their doors. Neighborhoods surrounding old factories grew derelict. Economic recessions hit the auto industry particularly hard, with dire ramifications for the city’s working class.
Capital Mobility
This section addresses the decentralization of industry. Deindustrialization entailed closing, downsizing, and relocating factories and entire industries. Technological advances in communication and transportation transformed industry by allowing it to move to low-wage areas. New highways facilitated the transportation of goods over long distances. As a result, capital shifted from industrial cities to new locales, including rural areas in the South and West. This concept, by which money and industry need not be centralized in one location, is known as “capital mobility.” Old Rust Belt cities like Detroit, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and New York lost hundreds of thousands of jobs as plants moved and replaced workers with automated technology. The automobile industry stood at the forefront of this process. Auto companies built factories across the country, weakening labor unions and reducing wages. Leaving Detroit allowed auto companies to expand their factories. Rural and suburban locales also facilitated access to rail lines. Auto-related industries, including machine-tool and -parts manufacturers, left Detroit soon after the automakers. Sugrue stresses that the decision to leave Detroit was not preordained. Rather, automobile companies relocated in response to specific political, cultural, and institutional forces related to the rise of unions.
Automation
New automated processes dramatically impacted Detroit’s industries starting in the late 1940s. The 1946 GM strike prompted the company to experiment with labor- and cost-reducing technology. The following year, Ford established an Automation Department. Competitors and other industries followed suit over the next 15 years. With automation came lower labor costs. Automated engine production, for example, cut labor by nearly two-thirds (130). Automation improved working conditions in factories by reducing hours and improving safety. However, it also eroded the control workers had over production and eliminated jobs. Corporate leaders praised the new technologies, arguing that automation brought short-term hardship but long-term gain. Labor unions were slow to criticize automation and instead focused on cushioning the impact of layoffs by extending benefits and improving pension plans. The unions also encouraged members to capitalize on government programs to prepare workers for automated jobs. These responses, however, did not address the root causes of unemployment. Automation touched every part of Detroit’s economy and reshaped its labor market, with severe consequences for the working class.
Chrysler, the Independent Auto Producers, and Suppliers
Chrysler did not capitalize as fully on automation as did Detroit’s other Big Three car manufacturers, Ford and GM. The company invested far less in automation and decentralization than its competitors in part because of a lack of funds. On one hand, Chrysler cut relatively few jobs in Detroit, making it the city’s biggest employer by 1960 (136). On the other, the company struggled to remain economically viable. Chrysler and small car makers, such as Studebaker and Hudson, saw their market shares plummet as Ford and GM fought for dominance. In 1950, for example, Hudson employed over 25,000 workers in Detroit. By the end of the decade, American Motors absorbed the company and removed all production from the city (136). The Hudson plant was then demolished and replaced by a parking lot. The loss of auto plants impacted other industries, such as tool manufacturing, wiring, and casting. Many companies closely related to the auto industry failed as automation became the norm in metal plants.
Cost: Labor and Taxes
Labor costs contributed to job losses in Detroit, with many companies leaving the city to exploit cheap, nonunion labor. For example, the machine tool manufacturer Ex-Cell-O built six plants in rural Ohio and Indiana in the 1950s, but none in Detroit, its former home base. The company’s president blamed union activity for this decentralization. Wage costs ranked high on the list of considerations when companies relocated. Higher wages led to higher prices, which made small firms uncompetitive.
Tax rates also factored into plant location. The tax burden in metropolitan Detroit was higher than in many other parts of the country, prompting employers to leave the city. Fearing job flight, Detroit officials froze property taxes between 1949 and 1958. Despite these efforts, however, business leaders fled to lower-tax areas, costing the city jobs and eroding its tax base. Neighboring states lured Michigan firms with the promise of low business-tax rates. The combination of low wages and low taxes made these states irresistible to many companies.
Federal Policy and Decentralization
The federal government played a key role in decentralization. During World War II, it built military facilities in suburban areas to defend against air attacks. During the Korean War, it allocated $353 million for equipment and plant construction, 92.5% of which went to suburban and rural areas (140). The Department of Defense also adopted a “parallel plant” policy, which duplicated existing defense plants outside industrial centers. For example, Chrysler moved tank-engine production to New Orleans, Ford shifted aircraft-engine production to Illinois and Missouri, and Cadillac started building light tanks in Cleveland. The so-called Sun Belt received the lion’s share of federal dollars, while old industrial centers languished. Once the “arsenal of democracy,” postwar Detroit became known as a “ghost arsenal” (141). Black people suffered disproportionately from the city’s downturn because of persistent discrimination in the labor and housing sectors.
Overtime
The increased use of overtime had a profound impact on Detroit’s workforce.
Starting in the 1950s, employers relied on overtime rather than hiring new workers. UAW members worked up to four hours of overtime per week from 1958 to 1962, the equivalent of 37,600 additional full-time workers (142). Overtime became entrenched across varied manufacturing industries by 1965. Although overtime appealed to many workers because it increased their wages, it eroded the power of unions by reducing their numbers. Some workers, moreover, did not want to work grueling hours.
Industrial Job Loss and Economic Distress
Economic erosion began in Detroit soon after World War II. The city lost 130,000 manufacturing jobs between 1948 and 1967, with job losses continuing almost unabated for the following four decades (143). The loss of manufacturing jobs removed economic opportunities for all workers, but those who lacked finances or specialized skills were hit especially hard.
Racial discrimination magnified the impact of deindustrialization, with Black people bearing the brunt of Detroit’s economic woes. The unemployment rate for Black people was 15.9% in 1960, compared to 5.8% for white people (144). Seniority benefited white workers more than Black workers. By the 1960s, Detroit had a seemingly permanent class of “long-term unemployed.” Older, Black unskilled workers and Black youths were grossly overrepresented in this group. The former had few transferable skills, while the latter lacked the necessary experience and education for even entry-level manufacturing jobs. A generation of young Black men were thus excluded from the workforce, trapping them at the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy.
Detroit’s urban landscape changed alongside its manufacturing sector. Once bustling factories were boarded up. Surrounding them were abandoned restaurants and stores that had catered to factory workers. Derelict shells and vacant lots pockmarked once vibrant neighborhoods. The vacancy rate rose as white workers relocated to other parts of the country and imperiled the city’s fiscal base. Detroit became increasingly Black and increasingly underresourced.
Chapter 6 outlines the responses of unions, industrialists, and governments to deindustrialization. The loss of manufacturing jobs raised political questions about inequity, power, workers’ rights, and corporate responsibility. In the 1950s, the working class thrived across many parts of the country, but not in Detroit. Black workers were hit particularly hard. National debates focused on countrywide economic growth rather than on Detroit’s declining economy. Instead of focusing on the decline’s structural causes, industrial psychologists and other pro-business groups blamed unemployment on laziness and educational shortcomings. Thus, they proposed addressing unemployment with behavior modification, such as job training. McCarthyism silenced critics of big business, painting them as Communists and forcing them to assume centrist positions. Labor activists also met with strong resistance from city officials, who did little to stem job loss and address Detroit’s class and racial conflicts.
The UAW’s Lost Opportunity: The Battle Against “Runaway” Jobs
This section uses the example of the UAW Local 600 union to address the impact of automation and decentralization. Based at the Ford River Rouge Plant in Dearborn, the 6,000 members of Local 600 went on strike in 1951 to protest automation and speedups, which punished workers who failed to meet high quotas. Officials did not inform workers about plans to decentralize, instead laying off hundreds of people without notice and moving equipment under the cover of night. The 1951 strike came on the heels of many skirmishes between workers and management. The year before, union leaders discouraged workers from using the company’s suggestion box, fearing it would result in further automation and layoffs. The National Negro Labor Council (NNLC) supported Rouge workers by arguing that Ford had a responsibility to Detroiters to keep jobs in the city. Rouge workers called on government officials for support, only to be ignored or rebuffed.
In 1951, Local 600 filed a lawsuit to reverse Ford’s decentralization policy. The union built its case around workers’ rights and corporate responsibility, claiming decentralization was a breach of contract and that the company had a responsibility to remain in Detroit. Contracts guaranteed certain benefits, such as paid holidays and retirement plans. By laying off workers, the company was breaching its contract and “substantially reduc[ing] the employment rights and opportunities of its workers” (160). The lawsuit also attempted to curb the freedom employers had to lay off workers at will and challenged the assumption that the mobility of capital did not require worker input. Local 600’s legal battle met with serious opposition from Ford, government officials, and even the national UAW, which refused to join the suit. Judge Thomas P. Thornton dismissed the case, arguing that nothing in the workers’ contract prevented Ford from decentralizing the Rouge plant. The judge also cited the UAW’s refusal to join the suit as proof that the contract was valid. Moreover, he ruled that Ford had the right to relocate and manage its business without input from its employees. The lawsuit underscores the power of industrialists and the militancy of Local 600. The union focused on rights and responsibilities, unlike the UAW leadership, which sought to adapt to automation with early retirement and more vocational training.
Industrial Renewal
City officials assumed companies left Detroit because of the lack of space. To promote industrial renewal and lure companies back to the city, they created industrial corridors and proposed to clear high-density, underresourced neighborhoods. These plans, however, met with strong resistance from residents, who lobbied to keep their neighborhoods intact. Opposition was so strong that the city abandoned industrial revitalization plans.
The Urban League’s Two-Tiered Employment Policy
Founded in 1916, the Detroit Urban League (DUL) traditionally functioned as a job agency for recent migrants, placing Black workers in unskilled and semiskilled manufacturing positions. In the 1940s, however, the DUL shifted its emphasis to helping well-educated, skilled Black workers, eliminating its placement program for migrants and the unemployed. In 1951, the organization found jobs for 356 Black people, only 22 of whom were unskilled. Two years later, the DUL placed 386 Black workers, none of whom were unskilled (167). These statistics underscore DUL’s new mission to nurture the Black middle class, a shift that left few resources for Black people with fewer skills and lower incomes. Although the organization did not address decentralization, DUL leaders recognized the dangers of automation, especially for Black workers with low incomes. Their solution was to promote education and job training, and to provide displaced workers with self-improvement programs, focusing on interpersonal skills and attire. These programs met with limited success.
The NAACP, the UAW, and Fair Employment Practices
In the 1950s, the Detroit branch of the NAACP became involved in antidiscrimination efforts and fair-employment practices. Alongside other civil-rights organizations, they sought to put fair employment on the municipal ballot. Their efforts failed because of growing pressure on leftist groups by the House Un-American Activities Committee. After this loss, the NAACP and the UAW lobbied to create a coalition of Democrats and Republicans to support civil-rights legislation. Corporate leaders opposed these efforts. In 1954, however, Democrats and liberal Republicans passed statewide fair-employment laws. The Michigan Fair Employment Practices Act prohibited discrimination in employment based on race, color, and creed. In addition, it barred job advertisements from mentioning race and banned employers from keeping records about their employees’ race. The Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) enforced the new laws by responding to formal complaints lodged by workers. The passing of laws, however, did not stop workplace discrimination, nor did it prevent employers from excluding Black people from certain positions. The FEPC generally focused on white-collar jobs rather than addressing the structural underpinning of workplace discrimination. The efforts of the Detroit branch of the NAACP similarly fell short. In the early 1960s, the organization convinced five department stores to hire Black sales staff. In 1963 and 1964, it picketed firms that didn’t hire Black people in managerial positions (175). However, the NAACP did not address decentralization and thus failed to help the majority of Detroit’s Black workforce.