logo

39 pages 1 hour read

Albert Camus

The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1951

A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.

Themes

The Nature of True Versus False Freedom

Camus makes a crucial distinction between true and false freedom in The Rebel. He claims that artistic and intellectual figures like the Marquis de Sade, the Romantics, and various nihilist thinkers promote a dangerous brand of freedom based in solitude and the rejection of all traditional human values. Camus brands this kind of “freedom” both destructive and selfish, writing, “If the romantic rebel extols evil and the individual, this does not mean that he sides with mankind, but merely with himself” (123). He accuses Sade of being the progenitor of this selfish kind of freedom, as a writer whose works feature “the demand for total freedom, and dehumanization coldly planned by the intelligence” (107). Such unchecked impulses for a freedom without limits and without moral scruples leads, Camus argues, to a sort of generalized societal nihilism that results in “the inability to believe in what is, to see what is happening, and to live life as it is offered” (151). It this nihilism that created the void that 20th-century totalitarian ideologies, such as fascism and communism, then sought to fill.

In contrast, true freedom does not reject community and the human values necessary within a community; rather, it embodies such values. Camus repeatedly speaks of true freedom in communal terms, as a man learning to identify himself with the needs and rights of others: “[Rebellion] founds its first value on the whole human race. I rebel—therefore we exist” (55). Furthermore, this true freedom requires rejecting excessive individuality and instead accepting limits on what one can and cannot do so that all can live in dignity and peace. As Camus writes, “real freedom is an inner submission to a value which defies history and successes” (404). In other words, while totalitarian ideologies promise freedom for the chosen few at an unspecified future date, real freedom lies in working to safeguard the rights of others through voluntary submission to the common good, and in upholding human values that refuse to allow the ends to justify the means.

The Dangers of Extremist Ideology

Camus repeatedly returns to the dangers of extremist ideologies, especially those that can justify violence and oppression in the name of some grand, overarching ideal. Camus observes that while the modern era has witnessed a general waning of traditional religious faith, the irrational fervor of religious thinking has often been transferred to modern secular ideologies: “Reason, among the nihilists, strangely enough, annexed the prejudices of faith” (337). Utopian ideologies like Marx’s communism also take on religious significance by replacing the traditional promise of a perfect afterlife with the promise of a heaven on earth: a perfect society in which mankind can finally achieve perfection. As Camus writes, “The idea of progress alone is substituted for divine will” (420), and “Utopia replaces God by the future” (452).

The greatest problem Camus sees with these ideologies is their potential to justify an almost limitless amount of crime. Utopian thinking “proceeds to identify the future with ethics; the only values are those which serve this particular future. For that reason, Utopias have almost always been coercive and authoritarian” (452). Most troubling of all, once a man is persuaded that his revolutionary ideology can bring about a world that is perfect in some way, such a man begins to disregard the needs and rights of real human beings in the present in the name of his idealized vision: “Henceforth, violence will be directed against one and all, in the service of an abstract idea” (351-52). With his unshakeable belief in a perfect future, a man will cease to think critically and will instead become persuaded of the necessity of undertaking any measure that promises to make his dream a reality—up to and including violence against his fellow men.

The Difference Between Rebellion and Revolution

While rebellion sometimes morphs into outright revolution in terms of historical context, it is important to note that for Camus, rebellion and revolution are not necessarily the same thing by default. In fact, he often presents them as contrasts.

Revolution is often driven by a kind of extremist ideology, in which the usual moral scruples and due processes of justice are jettisoned in favor of achieving some idealized, utopian ends as quickly as possible: “When revolution is the sole value, there are, in fact, no more rights, there are only duties” (355). Since the revolution promises a heaven on earth, the worth of the individual and the importance of human values in the present are disregarded in favor of taking an “ends justify the means” approach. As Camus writes, “a revolution is an attempt to shape actions to ideas, to fit the world into a theoretic frame” (233), and all those who stand in the way of this are persecuted or eliminated, since “[r]evolution consists in loving a man who does not yet exist” instead of preserving the lives and liberties of those in the present (23). Camus argues that this is why revolutions so often begin with idealistic aims only to descend into terror and oppression: When the promised utopia fails to materialize, the revolutionaries become more authoritarian and more desensitized in trying to reach their goal.

Rebellion, on the other hand, is less organized and often far less efficient than revolution, but it is also truer to the spirit of man and his better impulses. Rebellion rejects abstract utopian thinking in favor of asserting the worth and dignity of human beings, both in the here and now and as a transcendent value that defies the march of history. In Camus’s view, “[r]ebellion, though apparently negative, since it creates nothing, is profoundly positive in that it reveals the part of man which must always be defended” (48). Camus stresses that rebellion, unlike revolution, “relies on reality”—not utopian theories—“to assist it in its perpetual struggle for truth” (645). Most importantly of all, a true rebel never loses sight of the rights of others, as he wishes to “support the common dignity” (643) and to stand against arbitrary terror and oppression by “specifically attack[ing] the unlimited power that authorizes a superior to violate the forbidden frontier” (615). For Camus, rebellion requires accepting the fact that there will be no perfect ending, no promised utopia; “instead of killing and dying in order to produce the being that we are not”—as is the case in revolutionary thinking—“we have to live and let live in order to create what we are” (548).

The Moral and Philosophical Decline of Europe

Camus regards nihilism—a rejection of all traditional morals and checks on power, a kind of extreme cynicism that can justify almost any abuse or crime—as one of the defining features of modern European civilization. Camus argues that the fullest embodiment of this tendency is found in Nazi Germany. Writing in the aftermath of World War II, Camus explicitly denounces this legacy of nihilism and its effects. He explains that the “nihilist revolution, which is expressed historically in the Hitlerian religion […] only aroused an insensate passion for nothingness” (403), remarking elsewhere about the Nazis that “[s]elf-destruction meant nothing to these madmen. […] All that mattered was not to destroy oneself alone and to drag a whole world with one” (23). Nihilism’s greatest crime, in Camus’s eyes, is that it is merely negative and destructive instead of seeking to build something worthwhile.

Though nihilism may have reached its peak in Hitler’s Germany, Camus refuses to accuse Germany alone of falling for nihilist tendencies. He instead argues that Nazi Germany was the most extreme example of a widespread European malaise. While discussing the Nuremberg Trials, Camus argues that “the real subject of the trial [was] that of the historic responsibilities of Western nihilism and the only one which, nevertheless, was not really discussed at Nuremberg, for reasons only too evident. A trial cannot be conducted by announcing the general culpability of a civilization” (395). For Camus, Europe as a whole had gone astray, and World War II served as a hideous moral reckoning for the consequences of this moral and intellectual decline.

At the end of The Rebel, Camus warns that “the secret of Europe is that it no longer loves life” (662). The Rebel is thus both Camus’s dissection of the extremist and revolutionary crises afflicting Western civilization in his time and a corrective reminder of the importance of rejecting nihilism in favor of more humanistic, liberal-minded values.

blurred text
blurred text
blurred text
blurred text