logo

80 pages 2 hours read

William L. Shirer

The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1960

A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.

Part 3, Chapters 9-13Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Part 3: “The Road to War”

Chapter 9 Summary: “The First Steps: 1934-37”

From the mid-1930s to the outbreak of World War II, Hitler repeatedly bamboozled credulous world leaders with his “peace propaganda” (280). All the while, he orchestrated Germany’s rearmament and moved with calculated aggression against neighboring territories.

On March 16, 1935, in direct violation of the Versailles Treaty, Hitler announced that Germany would maintain a peacetime army of nearly 500,000 men. Western officials took no action. On March 7, 1936, Hitler’s forces moved into the Rhineland demilitarized zone and occupied it without resistance from the French. In October and November 1936, Nazi Germany concluded an “Axis” agreement with Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and an Anti-Comintern Pact (directed against the Soviet Union) with Imperial Japan. For the most part, 1937 proved to be a quiet year—a year of no more “so-called surprises,” as Hitler told the Reichstag in January (300).

A “decisive turning point in the life of the Third Reich” occurred on the afternoon and evening of November 5, 1937 (305). In the Fuehrer’s office at the Reich Chancellery, at a meeting with six of his top military officials, Hitler conducted a meeting that lasted more than four hours. At this meeting, Hitler announced his intention to expand German territory, by force if necessary, as early as the following year.

Chapter 10 Summary: “Strange, Fateful Interlude: The Fall of Blomberg, Fritsch, Neurath and Schacht”

Three of the men present at the fateful meeting of November 5, 1937—Field Marshal Blomberg, General Fritsch, and Foreign Minister Neurath—objected to Hitler’s planned aggression. By February 1938, all three had been forced out of their posts, along with Dr. Schacht, Hitler’s Minister of Economics.

Schacht was the first to resign. Having helped finance Hitler’s secret rearmament, Schacht now believed that the Fuehrer was leading Germany down a path that would lead to total economic ruin. Hitler dismissed Blomberg after receiving reports that the general’s new bride had once worked as a sex worker. Meanwhile, the Gestapo framed General Fritsch, accusing him of covering up his alleged identity as a gay man, as relationships between members of the same sex were criminalized. Hitler sent Fritsch on indefinite leave. Finally, on February 4, 1938, Hitler replaced Neurath with Joachim von Ribbentrop. The generals and cabinet officials who had opposed Hitler’s war plans were now gone. Hitler took personal command of the German armed forces. The Army officer corps seethed with resentment but did nothing to stop the Fuehrer.

Chapter 11 Summary: “Anschluss: The Rape of Austria”

Near the end of 1937, Shirer took a new job as a radio correspondent and was transferred from Berlin to Vienna, where he had a first-hand view of the March 1938 Anschluss, Hitler’s forced annexation of Austria into the Third Reich.

Following the dismissal of troublesome officers and cabinet officials, Hitler moved swiftly to apply pressure on neighboring Austria. On February 12, the Austrian Chancellor, Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg, arrived at Berchtesgaden for what proved to be a tense meeting with Hitler. For two hours, the Fuehrer harangued Schuschnigg on Austria’s treacherous history and issued an ultimatum, demanding, in effect, that Austria surrender its sovereignty. The Austrian Nazis already constituted a formidable minority, and Hitler had several highly-placed turncoats ready to betray Austrian independence at a moment’s notice. President Wilhelm Miklas, however, resisted a Nazi takeover of his country. Schuschnigg, having returned to Vienna and recovered from the shock of the February 12 meeting, rejected Hitler’s ultimatum and called for a plebiscite on March 13 to affirm Austrian independence.

Hitler flew into a rage and resolved to invade unless the Austrian government resigned. Schuschnigg finally capitulated and was replaced as Chancellor by Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart, an Austrian Nazi who spent much of the day on the phone with Goering helping to orchestrate the coup. Left with little choice, the stubborn and courageous Miklas also resigned. Mussolini endorsed Hitler’s move. Britain and France lodged feeble protests. Hitler made a triumphant entrance into Vienna on March 14 and then scheduled a new plebiscite to affirm the Anschluss. So great was Hitler’s prestige at this moment that Shirer believes an honest vote of the Austrian people would have produced a close result. As it happened, Nazi officials in Austria reported 99% in favor of incorporation into the Third Reich.

Chapter 12 Summary: “The Road to Munich”

Chapter 12, the book’s lengthiest, describes the tense situation in Europe during the summer and early fall of 1938, when Hitler set his sights on Czechoslovakia. This chapter highlights two major developments. The first was the birth in 1938 of a tepid, semi-organized, anti-Hitler conspiracy inside German officialdom. The second was the stupendous failure of French and especially British statesmen to halt Hitler’s aggression before it was too late.

In May 1938, Hitler ordered his generals to begin preparations for an invasion of Czechoslovakia by October 2. Several of Hitler’s top commanders were horrified, for they believed that such a move would trigger a European war in which Germany would be crushed. General Ludwig von Beck, Chief of the Army General Staff, led the opposition. Hitler outmaneuvered Beck, however, by appealing to younger officers eager for promotion. Beck resigned but was replaced by General Franz Halder, who, like Beck, came to regard Hitler as a threat both to the Army and to Germany. Although it was difficult to organize and maintain anything resembling effective resistance inside a police state, the anti-Hitlerite ranks swelled as war approached. By the late 1930s, the conspiracy included Carl Goerdler, mayor of Leipzig; Ulrich von Hassell, Ambassador to Rome; Johannes Popitz, Prussian Minister of Finance; and a few dozen others. The conspirators carefully cultivated a handful of like-minded generals, who agreed that Hitler would have to be arrested before he could plunge Germany into a war it certainly would lose. Quietly, they sent emissaries to London to determine whether the British government would go to war to defend Czechoslovakia.

To the conspirators’ dismay, the British government under Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeared determined to appease Hitler at all costs. As the summer waned, the British increased diplomatic pressure, not on Hitler but on the Czech government to make concessions to the Fuehrer. Chamberlain and others believed—or desperately wanted to believe—that Hitler would be satisfied with the Sudetenland, a region of western Czechoslovakia with a large percentage of German-speaking residents. On September 15, Chamberlain made the long journey by plane and train from London to confer with Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Hitler immediately and correctly surmised that Chamberlain would not risk war for Czechoslovakia. Indeed, the British Prime Minister was prepared to agree to the cession of the Sudetenland. At Godesberg on September 22-23, however, Hitler changed the terms by insisting on a Nazi military occupation of the region. Chamberlain returned to London, and war appeared inevitable. Meanwhile, the conspirators were ready to arrest Hitler, or so they claimed after the war. At the last possible moment, however, Chamberlain agreed to a conference at Munich, which made it impossible for the conspirators to move against the Fuehrer. At Munich, Hitler achieved all his goals—everything he demanded at Godesberg—without firing a shot.

Chapter 13 Summary: “Czechoslovakia Ceases to Exist”

In the weeks and months following the British and French capitulation at Munich, an emboldened Hitler, with his band of loyal and fanatical thugs, showed the world the true nature of the Nazi regime.

On November 7, 1938, a Jewish teenager shot and killed a German diplomat in Paris. Two nights later, in an act of barbaric retribution, the Nazi government unleashed an unprecedented wave of terror known as the “Night of the Broken Glass.” Thousands of Jewish shops were looted. Tens of thousands of Jews were arrested and packed off to concentration camps. All of this occurred under the direction of Reinhard Heydrich, head of the SS Security Service. At a grotesque meeting on November 12, Goering and Goebbels joked about subjecting Jews to various forms of humiliation.

Meanwhile, Hitler’s lies multiplied. At Munich, he had promised not to seek additional Czech territory. In truth, long before Munich, Hitler had cast covetous eyes on all of Eastern Europe. On March 14, 1939, he completed a coup to detach Slovakia from the rest of Czechoslovakia. Then, on the following day, German troops invaded what remained of Czech territory, Bohemia and Moravia. Hitler entered Prague that evening. Britain and France did nothing.

Part 3, Chapters 9-13 Analysis

Chapters 9-13 highlight two major developments in the history of the Third Reich, and the relationship between these two developments drives Shirer’s narrative.

The first major development was Hitler’s unprovoked aggression against Germany’s neighbors, coupled with the failure of European statesmen to appreciate the threat Hitler posed to world peace. Indeed, Western credulity in the face of Hitler’s brazen duplicity defies belief. On March 16, 1935, Hitler announced “universal military service,” which signaled “the end of the military restrictions of Versailles” (284), but he followed up in May with a “‘peace’ speech to the Reichstag,” which seems to have convinced foreigners of the Fuehrer’s harmless intentions (285). British newspapers published all of Hitler’s peaceful professions as if they were sincere. Worse than their credulity was their failure to act. French intervention in the Rhineland in March 1936 “almost certainly would have been the end of Hitler,” but this intervention did not occur (293). This was “a disaster for the West from which sprang all the later ones of greater magnitude” (295). Two years later, Hitler’s annexation of Austria signaled both the realization of a lifelong goal and the necessary prelude to the destruction of Czechoslovakia. Shirer marvels at the fact that “the leaders of France and Great Britain did not grasp this” (360).

The second major development was the birth of a German conspiracy against the Fuehrer. In the months following the Anschluss, the anti-Hitler conspirators made overtures toward British officials, informing them that the Army “would act, but that further British appeasement of Hitler would cut the ground from under their feet” (380). Still, even in late-September 1938, when “[a]ll the conditions” the anti-Hitler conspirators “themselves had set had now been fulfilled,” they did not act (407).

As the narrative unfolds, it becomes clear that Shirer views these two major developments as different sides of the same coin. The French and British failed to stop Hitler when they could have done so with relative ease while the German generals failed to remove Hitler before it was too late to spare Germany another world war.

Whatever the motives of Chamberlain and the appeasers of 1938, the German generals all agree that a) Hitler would have attacked Czechoslovakia on October 1, 1938, had Chamberlain not orchestrated the Munich Agreement, and b) Germany could not have won the war that would have ensued. This second point is the judgment not only of the conspirators but of Generals Jodl and Keitel, both of whom remained loyal to Hitler and were later executed at Nuremberg. This leads to “one of the mysteries of the Munich time which has not yet been cleared up”: How did the British and French not know that in October 1938 the Germans could not have successfully invaded Czechoslovakia and prevailed in a broader European war (424)? Shirer’s extensive research into the documentary record produced no satisfactory answer. Though the themes of complicity in Shirer’s work are often explicitly aimed at the German Army and the German citizenry, this conundrum further complicates this idea by suggesting complicity on the part of France and Britain as well. Connecting the dots in hindsight makes the bigger picture of Hitler’s path obvious, but Hitler’s charismatic deceit, as An Evil Genius and a Demonic Dictator, and strong-arming—as demonstrated in his ability to maneuver both the Chancellor and President of Austria out of office and replace them with Nazi party members—were formidable forces in real-time European political events.

Finally, Shirer notes that Czechoslovakia represented “a new turning point for the Third Reich, its first attempt “to conquer non-Germanic lands” (429). In this case, the confusions and contradictions in Hitler’s mind actually worked to his advantage. On one hand, his move into Czechoslovakia made sense in light of his determination to secure Lebensraum for the German people. On the other hand, the appeasers had good reason to hope that the Sudetenland represented Hitler’s final territorial demand, for the Fuehrer had always maintained his desire to maintain a racially pure Germany. That the Czech, Slavic, and Jewish people might be terrorized, enslaved, and exterminated did not yet occur to the leaders of Britain and France.

blurred text
blurred text
blurred text
blurred text