The Spirit of Laws

Building on the framework established in the previous two books—regarding the forms of government and the principles of their action—Montesquieu now outlines the laws of education as they relate to those principles of action. The laws of education are directed at the principle of the government. Democratic laws of education should be to inspire virtue, especially dedication to the homeland.

In a monarchy, formal education that fosters honor is not strictly necessary; cultural milieu is enough to teach the royal subject how to behave. Honor requires nobility, frankness, and politeness (31). The honorable subject “judges men’s actions here not as good but as fine, not as just but as great; not as reasonable but as extraordinary” (32). The education in honor does not direct one toward a love of the truth, but it does direct toward honesty for the sake of a noble appearance. Also, even though, in a monarchy, the royal subject should be directed primarily toward obedience to the prince, the prince’s legislation should never force his subjects to act dishonorably. To serve the prince in war is a great honor, regardless of victory or defeat.

In despotic governments, on the other hand, the only “education” is in servility. The state goal is only to enslave citizens: “Just as education in monarchies works only to elevate the heart, education in despotic states seeks only to bring it down” (34).

In a republic, proper education is imperative to the preservation of the state. Educational institutions must be maintained and properly oriented to build virtuous subjects. Montesquieu uses a variety of examples, primarily from ancient Greek city-states, like Sparta, to explain how education yields different kinds of virtuous characters. Montesquieu has respect for these republics, writing, “[T]hings were done in those governments that we no longer see and that astonish our small souls” (35). The Greeks, for instance, commonly emphasized gymnastics (physical exercise) and music to create a properly balanced, virtuous soul (the Greek concept for such balance, or “moral virtue,” is arete). The good citizen should not be preoccupied with craft, commerce, or agriculture. Montesquieu warns, though, that what benefits small republics may not work for large nations.

In Book 5, Montesquieu investigates various governmental legislations that accord with the government’s principle of action. He stresses the bond between passion (or principle) and the laws that order the political society: The more the laws reflect state principles, the more those principles are strengthened in the hearts of the citizens; and the more the citizens are impassioned, the more the state produces these good laws. In a republic, the love of the republic, which is virtue, should be the aim of the law. In a democracy, this expresses itself as love of equality, which, for Montesquieu, pairs well with a love of frugality and moderation. These loves are inspired, Montesquieu writes, by laws that aim toward actual equality and frugality: “[I]n order to love it, one must practice it” (44). Regulations on dowries, inheritances, etc. are necessary to properly institute this equality. Democratic laws should also reinforce societal frugality.

A developing theme in Montesquieu’s work is the emphasis on societal mores—the customs and behaviors that bind a community and express its culture. Montesquieu provides guidance on the maintenance of mores for the preservation of society. For instance, he says that paternal authority benefits the conservative maintenance of mores.

Montesquieu then discusses the dispensation of laws in aristocracies, monarchies, and despotic states. In each case, the laws ought to be different because each form of governance has a different principle of action. In an aristocracy, there should be an abiding “spirit of moderation” to the law (51). For example, the nobles (or aristocrats) should not be permitted extreme wealth nor forced into abject poverty. Likewise, monarchies should strengthen the principle of honor and, therefore, establish the nobility through hereditary lines. In contrast, the despotic state need not institute much law, as fear is its principle. The abandonment of fundamental law, and the untamed power of the prince (Montesquieu’s title for a despot or tyrant) reinforce fear in the people. More than anything, the despotic regime must protect the prince and his palace.

After a brief foray into the matter of presents and rewards as distributed via the various forms of government, Montesquieu discusses further consequences of the principles of action. The question of censorship ends the section. For Montesquieu, censorship should work differently for different governments. In the monarchy, there is no need for a censor since “the nature of honor is to have the whole universe as a censor” (71). In a republic, on the other hand, censorship is necessary; since republics require virtuous citizens, conditions must be maintained to prevent the citizens’ exposure to foolish, negligent, or dangerous examples.