The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the Greater Philosophers

In the late 19th century, Kantian idealism produced a backlash among those who wanted to restore philosophy to a more empirical foundation. One example was positivism, embodied by Auguste Comte, who posited three phases of learning: theology, which attributes phenomena to the divine; metaphysics, which refers to logical abstractions; and then positive science, which operates “by precise observation, hypothesis, and experiment […] its phenomena were explained through the regularities of natural cause and effect” (383).

Positivism found inspiration in the Industrial Revolution, which unleashed new scientific fields that promised nothing short of the transformation of nature and human life. Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution then seemed to unlock the secrets of existence, introducing the concept of biology into philosophic discourse. Where Darwin was a scientist, Herbert Spencer would distill his ideas into a body of philosophic insights.

Born to an irreligious family, and fleeing his one brief encounter with formal education, Spencer had only minimal reading of philosophy, but proved an autodidact with a great deal of practical experience. He pursued the classification of data to the point of obsession, even as his writings abruptly shifted from one focus to another. His first brush with fame was a troubled one, as his attempt in First Principles to integrate science and religion placed it alongside Darwin’s Origin of the Species in the despised books of the day. John Stuart Mill and other friendly donors secured the publication of his future works.

Spencer’s philosophy begins with the problem of first principles: i.e., how it is impossible to know the ultimate origins of anything, since everything in existence must have a prior cause. Neither science nor religion can discover these truths, and so they are united in their quest to learn what they can never fully know. The next best thing is to find “a broad and universal principle that will include all experience, and will describe the essential features of all knowledge” (397). Where Schopenhauer found will to lie at the heart of existence, Spencer found evolution to capture more accurately the processes of growth and decay, integration and dissolution. That which was once homogenous grows into something more diverse and complex as they encounter external stimuli and develop defenses against dangers. All life must eventually succumb to decay and eventual disintegration, not only for each organism but also for the entire ecosystem and the earth itself. This may be depressing in that it lacks any sense of eternal life, but the individual can still see themselves as a part—albeit minor—of a grand cosmic process. They may not understand its origins, but they can see its effects in their own lives.

Spencer’s later works turned to biology, which he defined as the “continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations” (402). This is true of both individuals and species, which alike balance their ability to cope with the external environment and the urge to reproduce. More developed species with longer life spans will feel less of an urge to reproduce. It is Spencer, not Darwin, that coined the phrase “survival of the fittest” (405), although he did not attach an overly fixed meaning to the concept of fitness, as in some cases it might be adaptability and in other cases a willingness to reproduce in great numbers.

Spencer also applied evolution to human psychology, and while his language is dense, he anticipates much of what neurology will later confirm through direct observation. A being starts with pure will, moves on to emotions (which are the collective instincts learned by the species as a whole) and then cultivates the habits of the intellect, reflecting the habits of their specific place and time.

Spencer also made major contributions to the then-new field of sociology. He saw society as an evolving organism, developing in complexity and heterogeneity. He associates both religion and militarism with more primitive societies (even if they are technologically advanced, he regards them as ideologically backward), whereas industrial and secular societies are more advanced. Military societies remain in constant conflicts while peaceful societies have room to develop new techniques, lessening their reliance on centralized governments—he criticized socialism for being overly reliant on governmental direction.

New scientific facts called for a new morality. Behavior which “conduces to the greatest length, breadth, and completeness of life” (418) was good, whereas that which shortened or otherwise attenuated life was bad. War was the ultimate crime for ruining so many lives to no obvious end. This leaves the state with little to do other than enforce broad principles of justice, and otherwise leave their citizens free to live their lives and exercise their rights to property and commerce.

Spencer was very famous and well-regarded at the peak of his career, but at the time of his death in 1903 his reputation had already declined, and he feared that all his work was in vain. Durant, however, regards him as one of the great champions of liberalism, and the triumph of that political principle in the 20th century is in many ways a vindication of Spencer’s project.