47 pages • 1 hour read
John J. MearsheimerThe Tragedy Of Great Power Politics
Nonfiction | Reference/Text Book | Adult | Published in 2001A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Chapters 7-8Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Chapter 7 Summary: “The Offshore Balancers”
Chapter 7 discusses the foreign policies of the United States and the United Kingdom, exploring whether these nations contradict Mearsheimer’s claim that great powers are inherently driven to maximize their share of world power. The chapter argues that, contrary to common perceptions of American and British exceptionalism, both countries have consistently acted according to the logic of offensive realism, particularly in their roles as offshore balancers.
The United States, initially focused on achieving hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, pursued a policy of territorial expansion and political dominance in North and South America. This expansion, motivated by realist logic, involved minimizing European influence in the Americas, as outlined in the Monroe Doctrine. The doctrine, articulated by President James Monroe in 1823, declared that the American continents were not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by European powers. Monroe emphasized:
[W]ith the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it [...] we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States (247-48).
The rise of American power from 1800 to 1900 saw the United States emerge as the hegemon of the Western Hemisphere, achieving its so-called “Manifest Destiny.” This expansion involved significant territorial acquisitions, such as the Louisiana Purchase from France in 1803, the annexation of Texas in 1845, and the acquisition of vast lands from Mexico in 1848. The American Civil War was a pivotal event in consolidating the United States as a powerful and cohesive state. Despite its continental expansion, the US did not attempt to conquer territory in either Europe or Northeast Asia during the 20th century due to the difficulty of projecting military forces across oceans against the great powers in those regions.
In Europe, both the United States and the United Kingdom acted as offshore balancers, a strategy involving committing military forces to the continent only when a rival great power threatened to dominate Europe and buck-passing was not a viable option. This pattern was evident in the US involvement in both World Wars and the Cold War. The United Kingdom, similarly, made continental commitments during periods when potential hegemons like Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany threatened European dominance.
The chapter also examines US military policy toward Northeast Asia in the 20th century. The US involvement in Asia during and after World War II was driven by the need to contain potential regional hegemons like Japan during the war and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Mearsheimer argues that the foreign policy behavior of the United States and the United Kingdom aligns with the predictions of offensive realism. Both nations acted as offshore balancers, intervening in Europe and Asia only when necessary to prevent the rise of regional hegemons. This behavior underscores the central theme of offensive realism: the relentless pursuit of power by great states. Mearsheimer’s analysis challenges the notion of American and British exceptionalism in foreign policy, highlighting their adherence to realist principles in international politics. The chapter sets the stage for a further discussion on how states choose between buck-passing and balancing strategies, a topic explored in the following chapter.
Chapter 8 Summary: “Balancing Versus Buck-Passing”
Mearsheimer analyzes the strategic behaviors of major powers, focusing on the concepts of balancing and buck-passing in response to threats by potential hegemons. Mearsheimer argues that these strategies are largely determined by the international system’s structure. In a bipolar world, like during the Cold War, great powers are compelled to balance against each other due to the absence of alternative powers to pass the buck. Conversely, multipolar systems, characterized by multiple great powers, often lead to buck-passing, especially when there is no clear, dominating threat.
The chapter explores historical European security competitions to test Mearsheimer’s theories, examining the responses to potential hegemons such as Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Additionally, it assesses Otto von Bismarck’s unification of Germany using military strategies.
Mearsheimer finds consistent evidence supporting his theory, with the United States having to balance against the Soviet Union during the Cold War due to the bipolar nature of the system. In contrast, multipolar scenarios showed varying degrees of buck-passing and balancing, with the most notable example being the lack of a substantial balancing coalition against Bismarck’s Prussia.
The analysis explores the British shift in foreign policy around 1905. Recognizing that France alone could not contain Germany, the UK moved towards a continental commitment, including organizing an expeditionary force to aid the French army and coordinating plans for joint operations. This shift led to the formation of the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907, culminating in the Triple Entente aimed at containing Germany.
The narrative highlights efficient balancing against Germany from 1890 to 1914. Initially, France and Russia allied against Germany while the UK employed buck-passing. However, as Germany emerged as a potential hegemon and Russia weakened post-Russo-Japanese War, the UK abandoned buck-passing and joined the Franco-Russian alliance, forming a robust coalition against Germany.
The power distribution during this period is pivotal. Germany was not yet a hegemon until the early 1900s, as evidenced by the UK’s dominant wealth and military capabilities until 1903. The German army, formidable as it was, found a counterbalance in the combined forces of France and Russia. However, the dynamics shifted post-1905, necessitating a change in the UK’s strategy.
The chapter examines Nazi Germany’s rise, presenting a different challenge compared to the pre-WWI scenario. Initially, the UK, France, and the Soviet Union pursued buck-passing strategies due to Germany’s lack of formidable military power until 1939. However, with Germany’s emergence as a potential hegemon post-1939, the UK and France formed an alliance, although the Soviet Union continued to buck-pass until its invasion by Germany in 1941.
The Cold War era analysis highlights the bipolar power struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. The US, recognizing the Soviet threat to Europe and Northeast Asia, immediately adopted a containment policy post-WWII. Despite occasional tendencies to buck-pass, the US maintained a robust stance against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, ultimately contributing to the latter’s collapse.
Chapter 8 underscores the impact of geography and power distribution on the strategic choices of major powers. It emphasizes the critical roles of system structure, power distribution, and geography in the strategic decisions of states like the UK, France, Russia/Soviet Union, and the US, in response to threats by Germany and the Soviet Union across different historical periods, illustrating state behavior in the face of potential threats to the balance of power.
Chapters 7-8 Analysis
In Chapters 7 and 8, Mearsheimer presents an examination of the foreign policies of the United States and the United Kingdom and the strategic concepts of balancing and buck-passing. These chapters further the argument of Offensive Realism and the Imperative for Power, illustrating how even nations perceived as exceptions to realist logic, like the US and the UK, conform to the principles of offensive realism through their roles as offshore balancers.
Chapter 7 challenges the notion of American and British exceptionalism in foreign policy. Mearsheimer argues that both countries have historically acted in accordance with realist principles, focusing on maximizing their power and preventing any other state from achieving regional hegemony. The United States’ pursuit of hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and the United Kingdom’s interventions in Europe reflect this strategic behavior. The narrative structure is methodical, weaving historical events like the Monroe Doctrine and American expansionism with theoretical analysis, showcasing how these actions were motivated by the logic of offensive realism. The quote, “The American drive for hegemony was successful [...] [and] the real basis of American exceptionalism” (236) epitomizes this argument, emphasizing the realist roots of US foreign policy.
Chapter 8 probes the strategic choices of major powers in response to threats. Mearsheimer illustrates how the structure of the international system, whether bipolar or multipolar, influences the decision between balancing against a rival power or buck-passing to another state. This chapter uses historical case studies, such as European responses to potential hegemons and Cold War dynamics, to underscore the theory. Quotes such as “A threatened great power operating in a bipolar system must balance against its rival” (267) effectively highlight the strategic calculations underpinning state actions.
The direct speech from historical figures brings a sense of immediacy and authenticity to the analysis, while the detailed recounting of historical events provides a concrete foundation for his theoretical assertions. The imagery of nations strategically maneuvering in a geopolitical chess game is implicit throughout the chapters, helping to illustrate the abstract concepts of international relations.
Mearsheimer’s arguments in these chapters contribute to the narrative of Offensive Realism and the Imperative for Power, showcasing how great powers, regardless of their perceived exceptionalism, are driven by the same motivations of maximizing power and ensuring survival in an anarchic international system. These chapters also elucidate The Nature of the International System and State Behavior, demonstrating how structural factors like the number of great powers and their relative capabilities dictate strategic choices.
