The War That Forged a Nation: Why the Civil War Still Matters

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2015

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Summary

Background

Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Chapters 1-2

Chapters 3-4

Chapters 5-6

Chapters 7-8

Chapters 9-10

Chapters 11-12

Key Figures

Themes

Index of Terms

Important Quotes

Essay Topics

Tools

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Discussion Questions

Chapters 5-6Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Chapter 5 Summary: “American Navies and British Neutrality During the Civil War”

McPherson explains why the American Civil War proceeded without foreign intervention. He outlines several factors that shaped British policy regarding the Civil War, identifying the actions of Union and Confederate navies as the most important factors.

The first action was the Trent Affair of 1861, initiated when Charles Wilkes fired on the British Trent to capture two Confederate envoys headed to Europe. Although Wilkes was initially praised by the American government and public for the capture, the perceived disrespect to the British Royal Navy prompted the threat of an Anglo-American War unless Lincoln were to apologize and release the captives. Lincoln acquiesced because the Union could not fight two wars simultaneously, and Lincoln’s acceptance gained pro-American sympathy among the British public.

The second action was the Union blockade of the Confederate coast. Initially a challenge for the Union Navy, the blockade became effective by 1862, and Britain was inclined to respect the 1856 Declaration of Paris, which held that blockades were binding if effective. The Confederates claimed to European powers that it was merely a paper blockade, but they were ultimately forced to admit the blockade’s effectiveness, given the shortage of cotton that was affecting European economies. Additionally, the Confederates appealed to European powers for the recognition of nationhood and intervention in order to alleviate the cotton famine. While there were periods of Confederate victory that compelled Britain to seriously consider intervention, the tide turned to Union victories with such conflicts as the Battle of Antietam, setting the stage for Lincoln to issue the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.

The third action occurred when the Confederate agent, James D. Bulloch, contracted private British shipyards to build warships in violation of Britain’s Foreign Enlistment Act. Bulloch employed clever tactics to misdirect the British Foreign Office and evade penalty, but his confidence after successfully deploying the CSS Florida and the CSS Alabama prompted him to contract more ships. To prevent further embarrassment, the Foreign Office ensured that no more warships escaped into Confederate possession. Because it became increasingly difficult to have the warships built in Britain without them being detained, Bulloch attempted to contract with French shipyards instead. However, the French government seized the vessels, eager to avoid rupture with the United States.

Chapter 6 Summary: “The Rewards of Risk-Taking: Two Civil War Admirals”

McPherson discusses admirals Samuel Francis Du Pont and David Glasgow Farragut. Although both were from states that practiced enslavement, Du Pont and Farragut swore their allegiance to the Union and were promoted to senior ranks by Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles. Critical to the discussion is McPherson’s comparison of the character traits and qualities of leadership that allow Farragut, like Ulysses S. Grant, to be remembered favorably for his risk-taking strategies and victories, while Du Pont, like George B. McClellan, has faded into obscurity and shame.

As commander of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Du Pont organized the largest fleet in American history for that time and successfully attacked Fort Beauregard and Fort Walker with a novel tactical pattern, allowing Union army troops to take possession of the forts, all of Beaufort, and most of the cotton plantations in South Carolina and the Georgia Sea Islands. Subsequently, he was to take Charleston, South Carolina, but the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Gustavus Fox, wanted him to do so without the help of the Army. Du Pont moved forward with Fox’s plan in a pessimistic fashion, demoralizing the other captains and troubling Lincoln and Welles with his defeatist attitude. Du Pont was defeated and could not hold himself accountable for his failure.

As commander of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, Farragut made the pivotal and risky decision to run his fleet past Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip during the night, resulting in a Union victory with relatively few casualties and injuries. The run was part of a larger plan to take the South’s largest port and city, New Orleans. This action was also a success and is regarded as one of the most important victories of the war. Farragut attempted a similar run at Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Although unsuccessful, this attempt still gave the Union control of the blockade at the mouth of the Red River, cutting off Vicksburg and Port Hudson from supplies. Farragut again proved himself at the Battle of Mobile Bay; rather than hesitating at the line of Confederate torpedoes, he commanded his fleet to go ahead at full speed, ultimately forcing the surrender of the Confederate forts and taking control of the bay with the help of the Army.

Chapters 5-6 Analysis

In Chapters 5 and 6, McPherson draws attention to the role of the navy in the Civil War and highlights how several considerations converge during times of war. When McPherson opens Chapter 5, he identifies key factors that shaped British policy during the Civil War, namely the cotton famine, enslavement, public opinion, Canadian colonies, and the international crisis in Europe. Although he emphasizes the actions of the Union and Confederate navies as “the single most important factor that directly or indirectly shaped Anglo-American and Anglo-Confederate relations” (66), the other identified factors appear in his explanations of the navy events.

For example, British public opinion was swayed as the Trent Affair unfolded. The cotton famine and enslavement became motivating factors in Britain’s determination of the Union blockade’s effectiveness, as well as its recognition of Confederate nationhood, and public opinion of the United States was also influenced after Lincoln issued the preliminary and official Emancipation Proclamation. The Emancipation Proclamation connotes an important Transformation of the American National Identity, while Britain’s recognition of the blockade’s effectiveness had significant implications for Britain’s future strategies in controlling their colonies or engaging in European disputes. McPherson orders these events chronologically to convey how easily Britain’s view toward intervention was swayed as events unfolded and to lend credence to his assertion that intervention “was a very near thing” (65). McPherson’s key point is that whatever economic, political, or diplomatic considerations there may be, a nation’s self-interest is always the underlying factor motivating its wartime decisions.

Another integral component of McPherson’s analysis is his attention to The Impact of Leadership and Individual Actions on Historical Outcomes. His explanations of the Trent Affair and the debacle around European-built Confederate ships include descriptions of the temperaments of inciting actors. He writes that “Wilkes was something of a loose cannon in the American navy. He had a bullying personality that demanded quick obedience from subordinates but often defied the orders of superiors” (66). Likewise, he describes Bulloch as “a master of misdirection” (75) and notes that Bulloch was “disappointed and angry” (78) before trying to contract with French shipyards. These character descriptions provide vital context for understanding how and why these individuals made pivotal decisions that forever altered the course of history.

McPherson uses a similar strategy in his Chapter 6 discussion of Du Pont and Farragut, with the added element of direct comparison between the two. He first describes Du Pont’s tragic flaw as “being unwilling to take large risks and then refusing to take responsibility for the failures that stemmed from this unwillingness” (94). He then asserts that [t]he opposite was true of Farragut—he was willing to risk his fleet and his reputation on the effort to achieve victory” (94). These are the “character traits and qualities of leadership” (81) that McPherson alludes to when opening the chapter and comparing the two admirals to McClellan and Grant, respectively, to “explain how one pair has faded into obscurity and the other emerged into greatness” (81). The mention of McClellan and Grant foreshadows McPherson’s discussions in Chapters 9 and 10, in which he elaborates on their military actions and Lincoln’s favorable view of risk-taking among his military commanders.

McPherson also uses irony as a narrative technique in his exposition of Du Pont and Farragut. Although both men originated in states that practiced enslavement, and although they both had associates who were Confederate sympathizers, Du Pont “left no doubt about where he stood” (81), while “there were initially some doubts” (81) about Farragut’s allegiance. Farragut’s emergence as the hero builds McPherson’s case for the evolution of perspective that shapes The Impact of Leadership and Individual Actions on Historical Outcomes, which becomes an important topic in Chapter 8’s analysis of Lincoln.