Wooden On Leadership: How to Create a Winning Organization

Wooden discusses motivation, punishment, and criticism. He argues that the threat of punishment is sometimes effective, but leaders who resort to punishment typically do so because they lack “an understanding of its limitations as well as the skills necessary to create motivation based on pride rather than fear” (166). According to Wooden, the “well-chosen carrot was almost always more powerful and longer lasting than the stick” (166). He points out that the best type of carrot is often intangible—approval and recognition from a respected figure. While positive acknowledgments have an impact, he warns that they should not be doled out thoughtlessly. In other words, “if you don’t mean it, don’t say it” (168).

Wooden also suggests that criticism should exist “within a framework of expectations—rules of behavior—from those under your leadership” (169). He writes that he never wanted to embarrass or humiliate with his criticism and largely used it in private rather than in front of others. According to Wooden, “the purpose of criticism or discipline is to correct, enhance, educate, modify behavior, or bring about positive change” (172). Another important aspect is that criticism should only come from the leader because the effects of criticism from player to player or employee to employee “can be very destructive to the group” (174). Wooden argues that “praise and criticism are volatile forces within an organization, but they can also come from outside the group, from friends, family, and the media” (174-75). In this case, he instructed his players to completely ignore what was said, deserved or not.

Wooden states that he refuses to answer the often-asked question concerning who the greatest UCLA player was that he coached. This is because “it runs contrary to [his] bedrock belief about success” (178). He argues that “personal greatness is measured against one’s own potential, not against that of someone else on the team or otherwise” (178). Wooden writes that his job as a leader was to create an environment that brought out the best in every member of his team, and that included players, assistant coaches, student managers, and even the trainers. His belief in personal greatness is also why Wooden was opposed to the practice of retiring numbers. He attended the retirement ceremonies for both Abdul-Jabbar and Walton, but he still opposed the decisions.

Wooden discusses Swen Nater, the backup center behind Walton for the Bruins national title teams in 1972 and 1973, alluding to how a player can become great in a supporting role. Nater’s primary role was as a practice player, tasked with scrimmaging against Walton and forcing him to become a better player. Wooden also mentions Conrad Burke, a player from UCLA teams in the 1950s, and Doug McIntosh, a player on UCLA’s national title teams in 1964 and 1965, as being two of his most successful players because “each came close to realizing [their] full potential through hard work and good thinking” (185). Neither Burke nor McIntosh possessed great natural ability, but both became key players for the Bruins. In closing the chapter, Wooden argues that “who’s the greatest” is the wrong question to ask. Instead, one should ask who “achieved personal greatness” (186).

In Chapter 13, Wooden discusses change. He begins the chapter by explaining how the 1961-1962 season was a turning point for UCLA basketball. At that time, he had been at UCLA for 13 seasons, and the basketball facilities were “perhaps as bad as any major university in the country” (192). Because of this, Wooden was convinced that it would be virtually impossible for the Bruins to compete for a national title. That season, however, the Bruins advanced to the NCAA Final Four for the first time and lost in the final seconds to eventual champion Cincinnati. He argues that the season changed his perspective completely “and removed a barrier [he] had imposed on [himself]—one that never should have existed in the first place” (193). There would be no more excuses or complacency for Wooden. Instead, he began searching for changes that would make the Bruins consistently competitive post season.

One of Wooden’s primary changes was that he became less democratic in terms of doling out playing time. Whereas he had previously played virtually all 12 players during games, he would now employ a rotation of only seven players. Wooden also altered his approach after determining that his practices were too grueling during the postseason and that he was implementing too much new information, leading to the players being spent both mentally and physically. Another change that he embraced was implementing a full-court defensive scheme, or press, which was recommended by assistant coach Jerry Norman. According to Wooden, “you must have people around you willing to ask questions and express opinions, people who seek improvement for the organization rather than merely gaining favor with the boss” (202). Wooden specifically cites his assistant coach, Denny Crum, who played for the Bruins in the late 1950s before becoming a coach, as someone who asked questions and made recommendations that made him a better coach. Crum would later become the head coach at Louisville University and win two national titles of his own.

Wooden discusses one of his primary coaching philosophies—do not be concerned about winning or losing. He begins by explaining that one of his rituals every season was to look at the schedule and predict the outcome of games. He would then seal those predictions away and not look at them again until the season concluded. He points out that his predictions “were as close as [he] came to worrying about what the scoreboard would show when the buzzer sounded at the end of a game” (210). Wooden also argues that as a day-to-day preoccupation, worrying about winning or losing is a “waste of time, stealing attention and effort from the present and squandering it on the future” (211).

Wooden explains that he drew from his background as an English teacher and approached the season as if it were a theater play. The offseason was for evaluating potential players, as if a director were assembling a cast of actors, and tryouts for the various roles came once practices began. Wooden continues with his metaphor and writes that the early-season, nonconference games “were like off-Broadway dress rehearsals” (213), from which he made adjustments to the performance. The actual play opened in January when the conference season began, and the encore came when postseason play began. According to Wooden, he explained to his team that it “was an incremental process where [their] attention had to be focused on producing the best stage play possible by focusing like a laser on each day’s rehearsal” (214).

Wooden discusses fate and adversity and how to deal with it. He begins the chapter with an anecdote describing how fate had smiled on him when he failed to ship out to the Pacific during World War II because of appendicitis. His ship, the U.S.S. Franklin, was sunk, and the man who took his place, who was also a classmate at Purdue and a good friend, was killed. From this, Wooden comprehended that while we cannot control fate, “we must do all things possible to control our response to it” (219). Wooden’s maxim concerning fate was modeled after his father, who had lost his farm due to a contaminated hog vaccine yet never expressed “anger, bitterness, or dismay about his misfortune” (221). According to Wooden, “an effective leader ignores the temptation—the easy excuse—of using bad luck to become disheartened, disillusioned, and defeatist” (221).

In the latter half of the chapter, Wooden provides examples of times when fate and adversity struck in his career. The first of these came when he was the coach at Indiana State and began getting offers from other schools, namely Minnesota and UCLA. While he strongly preferred the job at Minnesota, he ended up accepting UCLA’s offer because of a delayed phone call from Minnesota due to inclement weather. Wooden also describes the adversity he faced when he began coaching at UCLA in 1948. For many years, the Bruins “had no home court or the advantages that come with it” (225). This was because their tiny home gym on campus was declared a fire hazard, forcing the team to play home games at various gyms in the Los Angeles area. Wooden argues that “leadership in any context comes with such adversity,” but “your response becomes crucially important, because ultimately it is the response of your organization” (227).