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Henry KissingerA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
In the first chapter of World Order, Kissinger focuses on the Peace of Westphalia. He describes this 17th-century agreement as the foundation of the contemporary global order. The author divides this chapter into four related, thematic categories: “The Uniqueness of the European Order,” “Thirty Years’ War: What is Legitimacy,” “The Peace of Westphalia,” and “The Operation of the Westphalian System.”
First, Kissinger identifies the European system as pluralistic and, therefore, unique as compared to the rest of the world: “Europe thrived on fragmentation and embraced its own divisions” (11). One key reason why Europe was pluralistic was the inability to impose a single ruler’s will onto their counterparts. According to Kissinger, the lack of hierarchy between several rulers, such as the one that occurred in post-Roman Europe, was an anomaly.
Europe periodically did make attempts to unify, which included the 9th-century Carolingian Empire and the Holy Roman Empire that lasted from the Middle Ages until the early 1800s. However, European unity was challenged in other ways, for example, the spread of Protestantism, the introduction of the printing press in Europe to disseminate new knowledge, and the age of discovery and conquest starting from the late 15th-early 16th century: “The modern era announced itself when enterprising societies sought glory and wealth by exploring the oceans and whatever lay beyond them” (17). These major changes translated into a “revolution of thinking about the nature of the political universe” (17).
For example, the 16th to 17th-century French statesman Cardinal Richelieu likely based his ideas about international order on Machiavelli, by inventing “the idea that the state was an abstract and permanent entity existing on its own right” (21) rather than the ruler’s specifics. Kissinger contrasts this concept with feudal Europe, in which authority depended on the ruler and “governance reflected the ruler’s will” (20). French goals were practical: preventing a united central Europe from dominating the continent.
Successful foreign policy was based on three components: “a long-term strategic concept,” analyzing conflicting pressures, and acting to bridge “the gap between his society’s experiences and its aspirations” (23). The author compares the international area to the Hobbesian state of nature because there existed no supranational authority over individual countries.
After this, the author underscores the importance of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) as a devastating international conflict that ravaged the European continent and forced its leadership to arrive at a different set of rules in international relations. This set of rules was the Peace of Westphalia, a result of separate agreements. This peace was “a path breaker of a new concept of international order that has spread around the world” (23). In the immediate aftermath, the Dutch Republic gained independence from Spain via the Peace of Münster. The European powers also signed the Treaty of Osnabrück.
These revolutionary peace agreements meant that the “state, not the empire, dynasty, or religious confession, was affirmed as the building block of European order” (26). In other words, it was focused on procedural questions. The resultant balance of power, argues Kissinger, was better than the European religious wars of the past. Nonetheless, the ways to challenge the resultant balance of power still remained, such as threatening to achieve hegemony.
Finally, Kissinger moves on to the French Revolution of 1789 and its consequences:
Revolutions erupt when a variety of often different resentments merge to assault an unsuspecting regime. The broader the revolutionary coalition, the greater its ability to destroy existing patterns of authority. But the more sweeping the change, the more violence is needed to reconstruct authority, without which society will disintegrate. Reigns of terror are not an accident; they are inherent in the scope of revolution (41).
This particular revolution had a significant impact on Europe. One consequence was the fusion of domestic and foreign policies when France announced its commitment to support the revolution anywhere with the military. The Revolution also led to the Terror that targeted domestic opposition. Another consequence was the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte, an “expression of global power” (47). He dominated Europe, redrew its map, and was only stopped in Russia and at the 1813 Battle of Leipzig.
Whereas the Introduction underscored the key themes throughout World Order in its entirety, the first chapter about Europe demonstrates the consistent chronological structure of this book. Kissinger uses historic chronology for several reasons. He considers the historical development of each given region important to understanding how its culture, society, and politics are shaped over long time periods. He then identifies the important aspects of this development to assess each region and how it operates in the international arena. Similarly, the interaction between the unique geography and politics of each region—the foundation of geopolitics—is equally relevant.
As a statesman, Kissinger subscribed to the realist, practical foreign policy. It is, therefore, not a surprise that he considers the realist Westphalian system impressive: “The genius of this system, and the reason it spread across the world, was that its provisions were procedural, not substantive” (29). The Westphalian balance of power surpasses the specific ruling families or other types of affiliation. It is useful in its simplicity because it focuses on the state as the basic unit of international relations. This system also attempts to be devoid of moral judgments that might complicate matters when competing value systems, such as different religious denominations, are at play.
Kissinger is impressed by the fact that the Westphalian system spread around the world. By the mid-20th-century, this system operated on every continent. However, in this chapter, he glosses over the fact that at least in part some of this dissemination occurred through exploitation and colonialism and without the input of the colonized people. In the subsequent chapters about non-European countries, Kissinger revisits this subject to highlight how the colonized people used the Europeans’ own rules to free themselves. However, the legacy of colonialism is enduring because of the differences between the so-called Global North and Global South. Therefore, economic and political issues arising from the structure of international order are linked to the inherent inequality of this relationship.
The author also highlights the unique role of Britain, a maritime great power, which created a balance in Europe by backing weaker states in continental Europe. Britain’s policy sought to prevent a powerful state from arising in the Old World and, therefore, maintaining equilibrium. At the same time, Kissinger spends little time on elaborating that at times this balancing took on the form of warfare such as the British and French invasion of Russia during the mid-19th-century Crimean War. In other words, for all the brilliance of the Westphalian system, it did not prevent wars, including wars of aggression. Kissinger acknowledges this weakness when he discusses the Napoleonic wars. These wars displayed a certain fragility of the balance-of-power system. They also forced European leaders to update the international rules of the game at the Congress of Vienna.
The author also considers Europe a stable entity—that is, once the Europeans overcame the devastating wars of religion that occurred after the spread of Protestantism in the 16th century. The important role that religion plays in unifying or dividing the region is a consistent theme in Kissinger’s text. For example, he returns to it when discussing the Middle East.
Finally, Kissinger argues that the most stable international orders operate on the basis of uniform perceptions. The implication here is the need for basic shared values. Considering the cultural diversity of the world, there are obvious limits to the uniformity of such a framework. Also, these shared values are to be formalized in international organizations. Such platforms have their own inherent limitations. Elsewhere, Kissinger discusses the limitations of these organizations, for instance, the United Nations Security Council.
By Henry Kissinger