World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History

In the second chapter, Kissinger continues discussing Europe, its practical diplomacy, and its perceptions of world order. He divides the chapter into chronological and thematic subject areas. These subjects include “The Russian Enigma,” The Congress of Vienna,” The Premises of International Order,” “Metternich and Bismarck,” “The Dilemmas of the Balance of Power,” “Legitimacy and Power Between the World Wars,” “The Postwar European Order,” and “The Future of Europe.” Effectively, Kissinger covers almost two hundred years of European history in this chapter.

First, the author focuses on Russia which plays “a unique role in international affairs” (49). He considers Russia an outlier. Geographically, that country is located both in Europe and Asia, but culturally and politically fits into neither category. In the early-19th century, Europeans “viewed with awe and apprehension a country whose territory and military forces dwarfed those of the rest of the continent” (49). The presence of Russia, Kissinger notes, “stood as an implicit challenge” (50) to the European notions about the international order.

The author also discusses the Russian expansion across the Eurasian landmass starting from the 16th century. He believes that its ruling system under the Czar, its Orthodox Christianity, and its heirship to the Byzantine Empire are important for developing an understanding of that country. The author also underscores the Russian national character steeped in endurance and resilience when defeating both the invading armies of Napoleon and Hitler at great cost.

After this, Kissinger focuses on the Congress of Vienna (1814-15), which settled European affairs after the Napoleonic wars (1803-1815). He emphasizes just how different this situation was as compared to the Peace of Westphalia. After all, the previous balance of power did not stop the Napoleonic expansion. The Napoleonic wars also led to the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire which translated into major changes in central Europe. Another problem with the Congress of Vienna was that the European leaders “did not have congruent perceptions of what this would mean in practice” (63). They agreed on the overall balance of power, however, which involved geopolitical reshuffling.

Overall, the Vienna settlement had three key components: the Quadruple Alliance (Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia) to resolve territorial challenges; the Holy Alliance (Russia, Prussia, and Austria) to support domestic institutions; as well as diplomatic conferences to define common goals and issues. One unique consequence was the novel idea of neutrality, which Belgium received after its independence in 1831. The Congress of Vienna also achieved a balance between legitimacy and power. However, with time, the equation shifted to the power aspect, in which Britain played a balancing role.

However, this order did not last long and crumbled during the Revolutions of 1848, nationalist movements, and the Crimean War (1853-1856). In 1848, the middle class rose up against the conservative governments throughout Europe seeking liberalization. At the same time, linguistic nationalism threatened large empires like Austria, and, later, Austria-Hungary. Finally, the competing claims to being the protector of Christians in Jerusalem, under Ottoman rule, between the French and the Russians sparked the Crimean War. The French and British invaded the Russian Crimea where the Russian Black Sea fleet was stationed. These three events resulted in the end of the alliances forged during the Congress of Vienna.

After this, Kissinger moves on to discuss two key 19th-century politicians, Klemens von Metternich, Austria’s Foreign Minister, and Otto von Bismarck, the German Chancellor. These men truly shaped their age. Metternich was a product of the Enlightenment. Austria’s national interests, in his view, represented Europe. Austria was a multi-ethnic, multilingual empire united by faith, customs, and heritage. In contrast, Bismarck arose from a less cosmopolitan, provincial aristocracy in Prussia. According to Kissinger, Bismarck challenged many aspects of his period. Metternich sought to connect with other states as a matter of national interest, whereas Bismarck believed that “security could be achieved only by the correct evaluation of the components of power” (75).

The unification of Germany which occurred under Bismarck in 1871, was “a greater political event than the French Revolution,” according to the British Prime Minister Disraeli. At the same time, Germany’s dominant position in continental Europe put it “at risk of inducing a coaling of all others” (77).

In the 1890s a system of alliances formed in Europe which contributed to World War I (1914-1918). These alliances included a French-Russian alliance as well as the Entente Cordiale (1904) between Britain, France, and Russia. Diplomacy lagged behind technological development. Ultimately, World War I began “because political leaders lost control over their own tactics” (80). Instead of a “short, glorious war for limited aims,” Europe received 25 million dead and the collapse of the Ottoman, Russian, and Austrian empires (82).

The resultant Treaty of Versailles (1919) was handled poorly, especially the refusal to include defeated Germany in the European order:

Rarely has a diplomatic document so missed its objective as the Treaty of Versailles. Too punitive for conciliation, too lenient to keep Germany from recovering, the Treaty of Versailles condemned the exhausted democracies to constant vigilance against an irreconcilable and revanchist Germany as well as a revolutionary Soviet Union (83-84).

Kissinger argues that Versailles failed to achieve equilibrium or legitimacy and began to collapse as early as 1925 with the Locarno Pact. At this time, Germany refused to provide assurances of its borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia. In other words, Versailles was a ticking time bomb, which contributed to World War II (1939-1945).

During the Cold War, the world was divided into American and Soviet spheres of influence and, in part, dependent on the nuclear balance. Western Europe, however, began integrating starting from the 1952 Steel Community. Kissinger considers such moves “a keystone of a new European order” (87). In 1955, Germany joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, which was formed in 1949.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO lost its main opponent. However, this powerful military alliance was used to encroach on the historically Russian sphere of influence:

The projection of a military alliance into historically contested territory within several hundred miles of Moscow was proposed not primarily on security grounds but as a sensible method of ‘locking in’ democratic gains (90).

At the same time, Europe, as a political entity, pursued an independent identity. Kissinger considers it “a new unit in a now global version of the Westphalian system” (92).